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W(H)ITHER ZSCHERNIG?
CARLOS MANUEL VZQUEZ*
WH EN the Court granted certiorari in what became Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,' many expected a major constitutional ruling.
Court watchers anticipated the Court's first foray into the dormant foreign
affairs power since its decision in Zschernig v. Miller,2 the only case so far in
which the Court has struck down a state statute on the ground that it inter-
feres with the national government's exclusive power to conduct foreign
relations.3 The plaintiffs in Crosby challenged Massachusetts' law subject-
ing companies that do business with the military regime in Burma to cer-
tain disadvantages in the government procurement process. 4 The district
court struck down the law on the basis of the dormant foreign affairs
power. 5 Although the Court of Appeals affirmed on two additional
grounds, 6 most observers assumed that the Court had granted certiorari to
address the dormant foreign affairs doctrine for the first time since
Zschernig, and perhaps to repudiate it.
Both the soundness and the scope of the Zschernig doctrine have long
been a matter of considerable debate. 7 In recent years, however, the idea
that some state laws are invalid because they interfere with the federal
government's unexercised power to conduct foreign relations has come
under intensified academic attack. 8 Some of these critiques are part of a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for
comments received from James Anaya, Curtis Bradley, Viet Dinh, Steven Goldberg,
Michael Gottesman, Vicki Jackson, Naomi Mezey, Michael, Seidman, Robert
Stumberg, Mark Tushnet and the participants in faculty workshops at the
University of Arizona and Georgetown, and for the research assistance of Marye
Cherry and Peter Klason.
1. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
2. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
3. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am.
J. INT'L L. 821, 825 (1989).
4. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West 1997) [hereinafter Mas-
sachusetts Burma Law] (restricting authority of its agencies to purchase goods or
services from companies doing business with Burma); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370.
5. See Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (holding that "Massachusetts Burma Law
impermissibly infringes on the federal government's power to regulate foreign
affairs").
6. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affd sub
nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 457-62 (Harlan,J., concurring in the result);
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 239 & n.51 (1972); Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 164 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
HENKIN (2d ed.)]; Frederick L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92
AM.J. INT'L L. 704, 705 (1992); Bilder, supra note 3, at 821, 825-26 (1989).
8. SeeJack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1617,1664 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts]; Michael D. Ramsey,
(1259)
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broader attack on foreign affairs "exceptionalism:" the idea that cases rais-
ing foreign affairs issues should be resolved under different principles
than purely domestic cases.9 The critique of foreign affairs exceptional-
ism is, in turn, a part of a broader revisionist challenge to prevailing doc-
trine in the area of foreign affairs law. Revisionist commentators thought
that the Court had pulled the rug out from under Zschernig in Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, '0 in which it all but eliminated the "one-
voice" prong of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine.'' Many
thought that the other shoe would drop in Crosby.
Though the other shoe did not drop, critics of Zschernig and foreign
affairs exceptionalism have found much to like in the decision. The Court
in Crosby expressly declined to address either the dormant foreign affairs
power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause issues. It held instead
that the Massachusetts Burma Law was invalid because it was preempted by
a federal law imposing sanctions on Burma, 12 a law enacted three months
after the Massachusetts law.' 3 More importantly, the Court purported to
strike down the Massachusetts law through the application of "settled...
preemption doctrine."' 4 The Court held that the Massachusetts law was
preempted because it stands as "an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress's full objectives under the federal Act." 15
Most commentary on Crosby has stressed the narrow scope of the hold-
ing.16 Zschernig's critics have praised the Court's decision to rest its invali-
The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy
Federalism, 75 NOCTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 343 (1999); see also RobertJ. Delahunty,
Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37
STANJ. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2001); PeterJ. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1223, 1223 (1999); cf Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bar-
gaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1127 (2000) (criticizing
broad dormant foreign relations power, but defending somewhat narrower dor-
mant treaty power).
9. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1089, 1104-07 (1999) (coining phrase "foreign affairs exceptionalism").
10. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324 (1994).
11. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1705; Jack L. Goldsmith, The
New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1426
(1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith, New Formalism]; see also Spiro, supra note 8, at
1266; Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty By Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment, 31 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 491, 523-25 (1998).
12. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
13. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priation Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167
(1997) (enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009.121 to 3009-172) (1997)) [hereinafter the
"Federal Burma law"].
14. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
15. See id. at 373 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
16. See Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, International Decisions: Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 750, 753 (2000) ("Probably
the most commented-upon aspect of the Crosby decision to date is the very narrow
ground on which the case was decided by the Supreme Court, in stark contrast to
1260 [Vol. 46: p. 1259
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dation of the Massachusetts law on "ordinary" preemption rules, a
resolution in keeping with their critique of foreign affairs exceptional-
ism. 17 One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that, "[b]ecause
the Court carefully avoided any ruling on dormant or field preemption
grounds, [Crosby] has no implications for state international relations activ-
ities beyond state laws regulating transactions with Burma."' 8 The Court
itself indicated that it regarded its asserted grounds of decision in Crosby to
be narrower than the grounds it declined to reach. It purported to be
following Justice Brandeis' admonition in Ashwander v. TVA' 9 that consti-
tutional issues should be avoided where a statutory basis is available for
disposing of a case.
20
I argue here that a declaration of victory by the critics of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine would be premature. Notwithstanding the Court's
citation of Ashwander, the actual grounds of the decision in Crosby were in
no meaningful sense less "constitutional" in nature than a decision based
on the dormant foreign affairs power would have been. Moreover, even
though the Court said that its decision was based on a straightforward ap-
plication of "settled ... implied preemption doctrine,"2 1 the Court's pre-
emption analysis was anything but ordinary. Indeed, Crosby's version of
preemption analysis is subject to the same sorts of objections that
Zschernig's critics have directed at the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Moreover, if the case were taken as a model for deciding issues of preemp-
tion in purely domestic cases, it would be anything but narrow. The deci-
sion would be narrow only if its approach to preemption were confined to
suits implicating foreign relations. But then the decision would be excep-
tionalist, and the Court's holding would begin to resemble a decision on
dormant foreign affairs grounds. Indeed, I suggest here that Crosby's ap-
proach to preemption was so extraordinary that it would have yielded the
same conclusion with respect to the Massachusetts Burma Law even if
the broader foreign affairs and Commerce Clause grounds utilized by both lower
courts."). But cf Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT.
REv. 175, 215 ("When Crosby was announced, it was heralded by some as the death
knell for state international relations activities.") [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory
Foreign Affairs]; Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
481, 481-82 (2001) (noting that victorious plaintiffs "emphasized the decision's
value as precedent," while supporters of Massachusetts "stressed Crosby's narrow
compass").
17. See Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs, supra note 16, at 177, 178.
18. Id. at 215; see alsoJack Goldsmith, State Foreign Affairs After the Burma Case,
("[The Court] carefully avoided any suggestion that state foreign affairs activities
are invalid in the absence of some preemptive action by Congress. The decision
therefore has no implications for state foreign relations activities beyond state laws
regulating transactions with Burma."), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commen-
tary/20000626_goldsmith.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2001).
19. 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936).
20. See Crosby v. Nat'i Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000)
(citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 386-87.
12612001]
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there had been no Federal Burma Law. Crosby thus offers little cause for
celebration to the critics of dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Part I of this Article describes the Zschernig decision and explains how
the lower courts in Crosby relied on it in striking down the Massachusetts
Burma Law. Although the Supreme Court in Crosby avoided that seem-
ingly constitutional issue in favor of a purportedly subconstitutional pre-
emption holding, Part II of this Article argues that there is less of a
difference than may at first appear between a holding based on the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine and one based on obstacle preemption.
Both are subconstitutional in all relevant respects, and obstacle preemp-
tion is in any event vulnerable to the same criticisms that have been lev-
eled at the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Part III argues that Crosby
perpetuates foreign affairs exceptionalism. Part III(A) contrasts the Crosby
decision with the Court's recent constitutional federalism decisions and
speculates that the implications of the latter cases may have been over-
looked in Crosby because the case was perceived primarily as a foreign af-
fairs case. Part III(B) looks more closely at the reasons the Court gave in
Crosby to justify its preemption holding and argues that they were so ex-
traordinarily conducive to a finding of preemption that they would have
yielded the invalidation of the Massachusetts Burma Law even if there had
been no Federal Burma Law. Part IV considers the recent academic criti-
ques of the Zschernig doctrine and concludes that they justify at most a
modest reformulation, but not the abandonment, of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. I suggest that the Crosby decision would have rested on
sounder, and narrower, grounds if the Court had interpreted Zschernig to
stand for the proposition that state laws are invalid if they single out a state
or a group of states, or their nationals or those who deal with them, for
unfavorable treatment.
I. BACKGROUND
As noted above, Zschernig has so far been the only case in which the
U.S. Supreme Court has struck down a state law on dormant foreign affairs
power grounds-that is, on the ground that the state law interferes unduly
with the federal government's exclusive power to conduct foreign rela-
tions. This section briefly discusses the facts and reasoning of Zschernig
and how the lower courts in Crosby relied on the case to strike down the
Massachusetts Burma Law.
Zschernig was a resident and national of what was at the time East
Germany. He stood to inherit some property from a relative in Oregon
but for an Oregon statute that provided that nonresident aliens could in-
herit property only if three requirements were satisfied: (a) U.S. citizens
had a reciprocal right to inherit property located in the country of the
alien's nationality, (b) U.S. citizens had a right to receive payment in the
United States of funds from estates in that country, and (c) citizens of that
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1262 2001
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country had a right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without
confiscation.
The Oregon courts in Zschernig followed Clark v. Allen.22 In that case,
the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted a treaty between the United
States and Germany to preempt a California law that conditioned inheri-
tance by foreign nationals on the recognition of reciprocal inheritance
rights by the foreign nation-but only with respect to real property.2 3 Be-
cause the treaty did not apply to personal property, the Court in Clark
considered whether the state law was invalid as "an extension of state
power into the field of foreign affairs, which is exclusively reserved to the
Federal Government."24 The Court rejected the latter argument as "far-
fetched." 25 The Court noted that "[w]hat California has done will have
some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line."26 The
Oregon Supreme Court accordingly held that Zschernig could take the
realty pursuant to the treaty, but that his right to take the personalty was
governed by the Oregon statute.2 7 Finding that the conditions set forth in
the Oregon law were not satisfied, the court held that Zschernig could not
take the personalty. 28
With only Justice White dissenting, 29 the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Harlan would have overruled Clark insofar as it held that the treaty
with Germany applied only to realty.30 He would have struck down the
Oregon statute as preempted by the treaty. Justices Stewart and Brennan,
on the other hand, would have overruled Clark's dormant foreign affairs
power holding.3 1 The majority, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, adhered
to Clark's interpretation of the treaty but distinguished its dormant foreign
affairs power holding. The Court said that it had held in Clark "that a
general reciprocity clause did not on its face intrude on the federal do-
main."32 This case was different because of the manner in which statutes
such as Oregon's were being applied. The Court stated: "At the time Clark
v. Allen was decided, the case seemed to involve no more than a routine
reading of foreign laws. It now appears that in this reciprocity area under
inheritance statutes, the probate courts of various States have launched
22. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
23. Clark, 331 U.S. at 516.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 517.
26. Id.
27. 412 P.2d 781 (Or. 1966).
28. Zschernig, 412 P.2d at 791.
29. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 462 (1968).
30. Id. at 451-57. Justice Harlan disavowed the majority's dormant foreign
affairs power analysis. Id. at 457-62.
31. Id. at 441-43.
32. Id. at 432 (emphasis supplied).
2001] 1263
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inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign
nations .... ,,3-' The Court further noted that:
As we read the decisions that followed in the wake of Clark v.
Allen, we find that they radiate some of the attitudes of the "cold
war," where the search is for the "democracy quotient" of a re-
gime as opposed to Marxist theory.... And this has led to minute
inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law,
into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and into
speculation whether the fact that some received delivery of funds
should "not preclude wonderment as to how many may have
been denied the right to receive .... -34
The Court went on to state: "That kind of state involvement in foreign
affairs and international relations-matters which the Constitution en-
trusts solely to the Federal Government-is not sanctioned by Clark v. Al-
len."3 5 The Court accordingly invalidated the Oregon statute, noting that
a state "is [not] permitted to establish its own foreign policy." 36
The scope of the dormant foreign affairs power recognized in
Zschernig has long been a matter of uncertainty. But the district court in
Crosby had little trouble concluding that the Massachusetts Burma Law fell
squarely within the prohibited zone. The Massachusetts law prohibited
state agencies from contracting with companies doing business with
Burma except when the procurement is essential and there is no other bid
or offer, when the bid pertains to certain medical supplies, or when there
is no "comparable low bid or offer," defined as an offer equal to or less
than ten percent above the lowest bid from a company doing business with
Burma.37 The district court concluded that the law "has more than an
'indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries,' and a 'great potential
for disruption and embarrassment. ,-38 The legislative history of the stat-
ute made clear what was apparent from its face: that it was designed to
influence Burma's domestic policies and hence constituted an effort by
Massachusetts to conduct its own foreign policy.39 The law thus fell in the
core of the zone prohibited to the states by Zschernig. The Court distin-
guished Buy-America laws on the ground that they do not single out a
particular state for distinct treatment. 411
33. Id. at 433-34.
34. Id. at 435.
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id. at 441.
37. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1999).
38. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.
1998).
39. The Court relied in particular on a statement by the bill's sponsor, Rep.
Rushing, to the effect that, "if you're going to engage in foreign policy, you have to
be able to identify a goal that you will know when it is realized .... The identifiable
goal is, free democratic elections in Burma." Id. at 291.
40. Id. at 292.
1264 [Vol. 46: p. 1259
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The First Circuit, too, found it unnecessary to grapple with any tough
questions about the outer limits of the dormant foreign affairs power. Af-
ter a thorough discussion of Zschernig and lower court decisions applying
it, the court concluded that, "by targeting a foreign country, monitoring
investment in that country, and attempting to limit private interactions
with that country, [the Massachusetts Burma Law] goes far beyond the
limits of permissible regulation under Zschernig."4 1 Like the district court,
the First Circuit distinguished lower court decisions on the ground that
the laws involved in those cases "treated all foreign states in the same fash-
ion," and thus, unlike the Massachusetts law, "did not single out or evalu-
ate any particular foreign state." 42 Thus, while acknowledging the
controversy over the scope of Zschernig, the court of appeals, like the dis-
trict court, appears to have regarded the case as falling within the uncon-
troversial core of the zone prohibited the states by Zschernig, a zone that
includes at a minimum state laws that single out particular foreign states
for unfavorable treatment.
The plaintiffs in Crosby also challenged the Massachusetts law as inva-
lid under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and as being preempted
by the Federal Burma Law. Because of its holding that the statute was
invalid under the dormant foreign affairs power, the district court found it
unnecessary to decide whether the statute fell within the market partici-
pant exception to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, as the state
had argued. On the other hand, the court went out of its way to reject the
plaintiffs' preemption argument. Noting that the burden of establishing
implied preemption is "particularly heavy," the court concluded that
"[t]he evidence does not establish sufficient actual conflict for this court
to find [such] preemption." 43 The court of appeals found the Massachu-
setts law invalid on both dormant Foreign Commerce Clause grounds and
on preemption grounds, in addition to dormant foreign affairs grounds.
With respect to preemption, the Court said that the district court had ap-
plied the wrong standard. The burden of establishing implied preemption
is heavy, according to the court of appeals, only where "the subject matter
of the law in question is an area traditionally occupied by the states."
4 4
But "[p]reemption will be more easily found where states legislate in areas
traditionally reserved to the federal government, -and in particular where
state laws touch on foreign affairs." 45
The U.S. Supreme Court reached only the preemption claim. Citing
Justice Brandeis' admonition in Ashwander that constitutional issues
should be reached only when necessary, the Court stated in a footnote
that it was expressing no view on the Massachusetts law's validity under the
41. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 41.
42. Id. at 42; see also id. at 49 (distinguishing Barclays Bank on the ground that
it "did not involve a state law that targeted any foreign nation or nations").
43. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
44. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 94-95.
45. Id.
2001] 1265
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dormant foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. 4 6 The Court also found it unnecessary to determine whether a
less demanding preemption standard applied because the Massachusetts
law touched on foreign affairs. 4 7 While acknowledging that Congress' in-
tent on the question of preemption was "ambiguous,""8 the Court held
that the Massachusetts law was invalid because it posed an obstacle to the
achievement of Congress' full purposes in enacting the Federal Burma
Law.49 The Court thus purported to find the Massachusetts law invalid
under "settled" principles of implied preemption. 50
II. ZSCHERNIG AND CROSBY MoRE ALIKE THAN DIFFERENT
When the Court cited Ashwander as support for avoiding the dormant
foreign affairs issue and deciding the case on preemption grounds, it sug-
gested that a holding based on the former ground would have been of
constitutional dimension, while a holding based on the latter ground
would have been statutory. The suggested dichotomy is oversimplified
and inapt. There are varieties of constitutional doctrines and there are
varieties of approaches to preemption. Though it has constitutional un-
derpinnings, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is in fact, for most rele-
vant purposes, a subconstitutional doctrine akin to federal common law.
As has often been noted, there is no bright line between federal common
law and "mere" statutory interpretation. 51
Preemption doctrine, for its part, might be understood as "mere" stat-
utory interpretation. 52 But because its basis is a constitutional provision,
the Supremacy Clause, 53 it is often described as a constitutional issue. 54
The general approaches the Court employs to resolve preemption issues
are more properly regarded as interpretations of the Supremacy Clause
than as statutory interpretation. 55 Moreover, there are a variety of brands
46. Crosby v Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000).
47. See id. ("We leave for another day a consideration in this context of a
presumption against preemption.").
48. Id. at 388.
49. Id. at 373.
50. Id. at 388.
51. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 755 (4th ed., 1996); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note
8, at 1688.
52. See 2 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed.
2000) ("Perhaps, the most fundamental point to remember is that preemption
analysis is, or at least should be, a matter of precise statutory construction .... );
Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092 (2000) (not-
ing that, in preemption cases, "the task for the Court is ... the task of statutory
construction").
53. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 1.
54. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 134-35
(1963). This perhaps explains why Professor Tribe addresses the subject in his
treatise on American Constitutional Law.
55. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 278-90 (2000).
1266 [Vol. 46: p. 1259
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of preemption analysis, just as there are many approaches to statutory in-
terpretation. The Court in Crosby employed a branch of preemption doc-
trine under which state law can be displaced in the absence of any intent
of Congress either to displace state law or to enact a policy in conflict with
the displaced state law. This brand of preemption is, or should be, no less
controversial than federal common law.
A. Zschernig as Federal Common Law
In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis said that courts faced with both a con-
stitutional ground for a decision and a statutory one should decide the
case on statutory grounds. 56 He was, of course, concerned about the mo-
mentous nature of constitutional decisions. Such decisions frustrate the
wishes of a majority in a way that, if erroneous, can be corrected only by
constitutional amendment or by Supreme Court reconsideration of its
original holding. By contrast, if the Court renders an erroneous statutory
decision, its mistake can be corrected through the enactment of a
statute.
57
If this is the reason to prefer a non-constitutional basis of decision,
then the dormant foreign affairs doctrine should qualify as a non-constitu-
tional doctrine. Like decisions based on the dormant Commerce Clause,
decisions based on the dormant foreign affairs power are revisable by Con-
gress. 58 Thus, had the Court decided that the Massachusetts Burma Law
was invalid because it interfered with the political branches' conduct of
56. SeeAshwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring)
(stating that Court will resolve issue on non-constitutional grounds if possible).
57. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also infra note 82.
58. See HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 164-65; Bilder, supra note 3, at 826;
Delahunty, supra note 8, at 42; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1664
(describing Zschernig doctrine as federal common law); Alfred Hill, The Law-Mak-
ing Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024,
1080 (1967). Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider
whether the federal government by statute may validate state laws that would other-
wise be invalid under dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the conclusion that it may
do so seems to follow from the doctrine's rationale. Under this doctrine, state laws
are invalid because they intrude on the federal government's exclusive power to
conduct foreign relations. A federal statute permitting states to "interfere" with
foreign relations would appear to be a valid exercise of this exclusive power. The
closely related dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is understood to be revisable
by Congress, see infra, as is the even-more-closely related dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause doctrine. See Delahunty, supra note 8, at 38. Cf Barclays Bank PLC
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330 (1994) (relying on Congress' failure to
preempt law such as California's in concluding that law is not invalid under dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause). It is true that the Court in Zschernigstruck down
the Oregon statute notwithstanding the Executive branch's representation that the
statute did not interfere with its ability to conduct foreign relations. See Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968). But a statute passed by Congress and signed by
the President obviously stands on a different footing than a representation to the
Court by the Executive branch. See HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 164-65.
12672001]
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foreign affairs, Congress could have nullified that holding simply by pass-
ing a statute expressly approving the Massachusetts Law. In other words, it
would take exactly the same thing (a statute) to correct a decision errone-
ously striking down the Massachusetts law on dormant foreign affairs
grounds as a decision erroneously striking down the Massachusetts law on
ordinary preemption grounds. On this score, there appears to be no rea-
son to prefer one ground of decision to the other.
The difference between the two grounds of decision is that, in the
one case, a state law is struck down without any prior action by Congress,
while in the other case, the state law is struck down because it is deemed to
be in conflict with some statute passed by Congress. In other words, in the
first case, a state law is struck down in the face of congressional silence or
inaction, whereas in the second case the statute is struck down because of
congressional action. But, as will soon become apparent, things are not
quite that simple. As discussed further below, Crosby itself struck down the
Massachusetts Burma Law in the face of congressional silence on the ques-
tion of preemption.5 9
The centrality of congressional silence to the question of the legiti-
macy of dormant foreign affairs doctrine is illuminated by an examination
of the debate among the Justices about the legitimacy of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. Like dormant foreign affairs doctrine, dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine requires the invalidation of state laws in
the absence of a specific constitutional provision making such laws uncon-
stitutional and in the absence of a statute rendering the state law invalid.
The text of the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, but it does not purport to invalidate any state laws of its
own force. 61 1 Yet the Court has long interpreted the Clause to invalidate
state laws that discriminate against or otherwise unduly burden interstate
commerce.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have at vari-
ous times called into question the very idea of a dormant Commerce
In a footnote in his treatise, Professor Tribe expresses the view that "Congress
[may] not ratify a state's intrusion into foreign affairs." 1 TRIBE, supra note 52, at
1246 n.45. His only support for that proposition, however, is Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion in Zschernig declining to defer to the Executive branch's amicus
brief on the ground that resolution of this issue "cannot vary from day to day with
the shifting winds at the State Department." Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443. It does not
follow, of course, that the doctrine is riot revisable by Congress. To be sure, a doc-
trine under which even Congress and the President through statute may not au-
thorize state laws that interfere with foreign relations is conceivable. But the critics
of Zschernig have not so understood the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, and the
defense of the doctrine I offer here is a defense of a doctrine under which Con-
gress may affirmatively authorize state laws that would otherwise run afoul of the
doctrine.
59. For a discussion of congressional silence on the issue of federal preemp-
tion in the Federal Burma Law, see infra Part II(B).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause.6 They have argued that the Clause was never intended to license
judicial invalidation of state laws without prior action by Congress.6 2
Against this attack, the other Justices have noted that, even if it were true
that the Clause was never intended to have a self-executing aspect, it
would not be necessary to change the Court's approach. 63 That is because
Congress "unquestionably has the power to repudiate" the whole course of
the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 64 In
other words, even if that jurisprudence were not otherwise supported by
constitutional text or history, Congress' failure to repudiate it would legiti-
mize it. On this view, when the courts invalidate a state law under the
dormant Commerce Clause, they are doing so pursuant to an implicit del-
egation of power by Congress. It is as if Congress had passed a law to the
effect that state statutes that discriminate against interstate or foreign com-
merce, or impose an undue burden on such commerce, shall be pre-
empted. The Court's articulation and enforcement pursuant to such a
statute of a federal common law identical in content to its current dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence would be no more problematic
than its development of a federal common law of labor-management rela-
tions pursuant to an implicit delegation in section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act,6 5 or even its development of a federal common law of trade regula-
tion pursuant to the Sherman Act.66 Striking down state laws pursuant to
such a delegation would be the equivalent of striking them down on pre-
emption grounds.
The dissenting Justices respond that congressional silence cannot be
equated with congressional delegation. They argue that treating silence as
delegation would run afoul of the bicameralism and presentment require-
61. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202-03 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Tyler Pipe Ind., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 486 U.S. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 571.
64. See id. at 572.
65. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994); see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957)
(holding federal common law is to be applied to suits under LMRA). It is no
accident that the author of Lincoln Mills was the author of Zschernig.
66. Federal antitrust law has been likened by many to federal common law
because of the tenuous link such law has with the Sherman Act's text. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domain, 50 U. C-i. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CI. L. REV. 1, 44-45
(1985); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263,
269; Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An "Institutionalist Perspective" 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 789 (1989). But cf.
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 289 (1990) (arguing Sherman
Act does not delegate common law authority to courts).
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ments, as construed in INS v. Chadha.67 This echoes a frequent criticism
of the dormant foreign affairs power, and more generally of federal com-
mon law. The Constitution sets up a demanding procedure for the dis-
placement of state law by federal statute, thus placing the burden of
inertia on the federal government. It purposely sets up a procedure-
requiring the affirmative votes of a majority of two Houses plus the Presi-
dent, or two-thirds of both Houses without the President-that tilts the
scales in favor of the States. 68 The process is designed to ensure that the
interests of the States are represented, and that any displacement of state
law is done by the politically accountable branches. When the Court en-
gages in federal common law-making, or strikes down a state law on the
basis of the dormant foreign affairs power, it circumvents these political
safeguards of federalism.
69
Notwithstanding Chadha, however, the Court continues to rely on
congressional activity short of legislation, and even on congressional si-
lence, in deciding whether state law is displaced. In Dames & Moore v.
Regan,70 for example, the Court upheld a sole executive agreement that
suspended private claims against Iran because, inter alia, Congress had
failed to object to it.7 1 Indeed, Crosby itself shows the Court's willingness
to rely on congressional activity falling short of the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements, and even congressional silence. As discussed in
greater detail below, the Court in Crosby struck down the Massachusetts
Burma Law in the face of congressional silence on the question of pre-
emption. 72 Additionally, in seeming violation of the bicameralism re-
quirement, the Court relied on statements by the Executive branch
objecting in various ways to the Massachusetts law. 73 This seemed to de-
part from the Court's approach to such statements in Barclays Bank, in
which the Court said: "Executive branch communications that express fed-
eral policy but lack the force of law cannot render [a state law]
unconstitutional .,,74
67. Camps Nevfound/Owatonna, 521) U.S. at 617 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 920 (1983) (noting that Framers intended bicamera-
lism and presentment requirements to serve essential constitutional functions in
regulating powers of federal government).
68. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 7, cl. 3.
69. For a critique of federal common law along these lines, see Merrill, supra
note 66, at 19-24. For a similar critique of dormant foreign affairs doctrine, see
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1693-95.
70. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
71. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687 (noting that "Congress has not disap-
proved of the action taken" by President); id. at 688 (noting that "Congress acqui-
esced in the President's action").
72. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (refer-
ring to "ambiguous" "silence" on question of preemption).
73. See id. at 385-86.
74. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330 (1994).
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The Court in Crosby also departed from Barclays Bank by taking ac-
count of foreign government protests. 75 In explaining this apparent shift,
the Crosby Court distinguished Barclays Bank as a case in which "Congress
had taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of foreign govern-
ments and the Executive," whereas, "[h]ere, however, Congress has done
nothing to render such evidence beside the point."7 6 Congress' "specific
action" that was relevant in the Barclays Bank case was evidence that "Con-
gress had focused its attention on this issue, but has refrained from exer-
cising its authority to prohibit" the challenged state laws. 7 7 The Court
thus appears to have equated congressional silence with approval, at least
when Congress has focused on the issue.78
These cases may just show that the Court remains willing to rely on
congressional silence in the foreign affairs area, but that is an explanation
that can hardly please critics of foreign affairs exceptionalism. In any
event, Chadha has not prevented the Court from taking account of con-
gressional inaction even in the purely domestic sphere. For example, in
construing statutes, the Court often treats Congress' failure to modify an
otherwise questionable judicial interpretation as legitimizing that interpre-
tation. 79 It is true that a minority of Justices (the same Justices who are
critical of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine) object to this prac-
tice. 8°l But even these Justices accept the doctrine of stare decisis, 8 1 and
they acknowledge that this doctrine operates most strongly in cases of stat-
utory interpretation.8 2 The well-established distinction between constitu-
tional and non-constitutional decisions for purposes of stare decisis has
been justified on the ground that judicial errors in interpreting statutes
75. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385-86.
76. Id. at 385.
77. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329. Justice Scalia criticized this reliance as
inconsistent with the Court's later acknowledgment that silence can be ambiguous.
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377-78 & n.13.
78. Somewhat inconsistently, the Court in Crosby rebuffed the state's argu-
ment that Congress' failure to include an express preemption provision in the
Federal Burma Law, despite its awareness of the Massachusetts law, should be con-
strued as acquiescence. The Court described this congressional silence as ambigu-
ous. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. The significance of the Court's willingness to find
the state law preempted in the face of such congressional ambiguity is discussed
further below.
79. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-29 & n.7 (1987).
80. See id. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that inference of congres-
sional intent should not be drawn from failure to enact legislation).
81. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 & n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (suggesting acceptance of stare decisis); ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 138-39 (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989).
82. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) ("That policy [stare
decisis] is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpreta-
tion can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior
decisions."); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000); State Oil
Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
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can be corrected by Congress, whereas judicial errors on constitutional
questions are more difficult to correct.8 3 To this extent, therefore, all of
the Justices are willing to treat Congress' failure to correct an otherwise
questionable decision on a nonconstitutional issue as legitimating that
decision.
84
Indeed, the Justices who object to the Court's reliance on congres-
sional silence do not urge a wholesale rejection of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine; they argue merely that the doctrine should not be ex-
panded. Because of the doctrine's pedigree, they would continue to ad-
here to some version of the doctrine as a matter of stare decisis. 85 For the
same reason, the argument that dormant foreign affairs doctrine is unsup-
ported by constitutional text or original intent8 6 does not necessarily war-
rant the doctrine's repudiation. Because of the doctrine's
subconstitutional status, the doctrine is entitled to the same strong pre-
sumption of continuity as the Court's decisions construing statutes.8 7
Even if wrong as an original matter, therefore, the doctrine should be re-
pudiated only for very strong reasons of the sort needed to repudiate erro-
neous statutory interpretation. As discussed in Part IV below, the reasons
offered by the critics of dormant foreign affairs doctrine fall short. In the
next section, I argue that Crosby itself comes very close to reaffirming the
doctrine. Indeed, I exaggerate only slightly when I say that Crosby is a dor-
mant foreign affairs case in disguise.
83. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
84. The doctrine of stare decisis has bite, of course, only when it causes a
judge to adhere to a decision that he regards as otherwise questionable.
85. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
609-10 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring). I agree that a doctrine that owes its life to the principle of
stare decisis does not deserve to be expanded. See Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Night
and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Dis-
tinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 88 (1998).
86. See Ramsey supra note 8, at 347-48 (arguing that dormant foreign affairs
doctrine is unsupported by text or original intent). But cf Swaine, supra note 8, at
1150 (arguing that Framers intended a "dormant treaty power").
87. It might be objected here that I (and Justice Stevens) have made the mis-
take of inferring a congressional power to reject these dormant doctrines whole-
sale from authorities that at most support the proposition that Congress may
resurrect particular state laws. Because we are both defending these doctrines
against critics who do not even believe the doctrines exist, however, perhaps the
more relevant point is that, if the doctrines did not in fact exist, Congress surely
would have the power to create them by statute. See supra text accompanying notes
65-66. Our point is that the courts are entitled to act as if Congress had created
the doctrines because its failure even to attempt to repudiate them despite a plau-
sible claim that it possesses the power to do so warrants an inference that Congress
acquiesces in them. This is a reasonable inference given that the doctrines relieve
Congress of the significant burden of monitoring state laws without depriving
them of the ultimate power to approve such laws. In any event, Zschernig is, at a
minimum, entitled to the benefit of the version of stare decisis the Court applies in
constitutional cases.
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B. Crosby as Federal Common Law
As noted above, those who criticize the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine and other forms of federal common law regard it as less legitimate
than ordinary preemption because, in the case of preemption, the policy
determinations are traceable to Congress, whereas in the other cases, Con-
gress has not spoken.88 It is no answer, in their view,' that Congress is free
to overrule the Court in all three cases. The Constitution's provisions set-
ting forth the procedures for enacting legislation impose numerous obsta-
cles to the displacement of state law, chief among them the bicameralism
and presentment requirements. 89 These requirements protect state pre-
rogatives because the states are represented in the legislative process.90 At
the same time, they assure that the federal lawmaking branches will be
accountable for any federal decision to displace state law. 9 1 When the
courts decide to displace state law on the basis of federal common law, the
safeguards of the bicameralism and presentment requirements are circum-
vented and no political actors can easily be held accountable for the
displacement.
If that is the reason to prefer ordinary preemption to the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, then Crosby should not please the critics of the
latter doctrine. The foregoing critique of federal common law supplies a
reason to prefer express or conflict preemption. When Congress expressly
states, for example, that state laws imposing sanctions on Burma are pre-
empted, then its members can be held accountable for displacing state law
imposing sanctions on Burma. Similarly, when Congress enacts a law pro-
viding that persons shall have the right to do business in Burma, its mem-
bers can be held accountable for that policy and the resulting
displacement of conflicting state law. But Congress did neither when it
passed the Federal Burma Law. The Court found the Massachusetts
Burma Law to be preempted on the basis of the branch of preemption
doctrine known as "obstacle" preemption, under which state laws are
sometimes impliedly preempted.9 2 This brand of preemption suffers from
the same flaws that the critics of federal common law ascribe to the latter
doctrine. 93
88. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1687; Ramsey, supra note 8,
at 376 n.13; Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs, supra note 16, at 215; see also Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 617 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59
(1983)) (arguing that legislative silence ignores constitutional requirements of bi-
cameralism and presentment).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (setting forth legislative procedures).
90. See Merrill, supra note 66, at 16 (noting that "states are represented in
Congress and are thus able to block expansion initiatives").
91. See id. at 24-27 (stressing electoral accountability).
92. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380-85 (2000).
93. For critiques of obstacle preemption along these lines, see Nelson, supra
note 55, at 278-90. For a defense of the presumption against preemption along
the same lines, see Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEx. L. REv. 1321, 1427-30 (2001). See also 1 TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1175-76.
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Massachusetts argued in Crosby that Congress had intended to leave
the Massachusetts law in force because it was aware of its existence yet did
not declare it preempted. 9 4 The Court in Crosby recognized that Congress
had been silent on the preemption issue, but declined to interpret that
silence as acquiescence because, in its view, the silence was "ambiguous."9 5
Thus, in the Court's own description, the Massachusetts law was held pre-
empted with only ambiguous silence on the part of Congress on the pre-
cise question.
Because Congress was silent on the preemption question, no member
of Congress was held accountable for the preemption of the Massachusetts
Burma Law when the law was passed. Indeed, before Crosby was decided,
most commentators, including those who believed that the Massachusetts
law was invalid, had concluded that the Massachusetts law was not invalid
because of congressional preemption.9 6 It is true that the Court's decision
in Crosby makes it clear now that the Court thinks that Congress is to be
blamed (or credited) for preempting the Massachusetts law. But the fact
that nothing in the federal law indicates that the state law is preempted
means that members of Congress can escape accountability simply by argu-
ing (quite plausibly) that the Court misinterpreted the statute.9 7 At most,
Congress can be blamed for failing to reinstate the Massachusetts law after
the Crosby decision, but the same would be true had the decision rested on
dormant foreign affairs grounds instead of preemption.
The Court speculated that Congress may well have considered it un-
necessary to address the preemption issue because it was confident that
the courts would find the state law preempted under "settled" principles
94. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 386-87.
95. See id. at 387-88.
96. See Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State
and Local "Sanctions "Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a Sony
State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 322 n.81 (1999); Spiro, supra note 8,
at 1254 (noting that Congress had "no institutional position" on the issue); Swaine,
supra note 8, at 1156-59; see also Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp.
2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Memorandum on the Non-
preemptive Effect of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 Upon State
and Local Measures, Cong. Rec. S. 12,535 (Sept. 15, 1986). But see Daniel M. Price
& John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39
HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 471-78 (1998) (pre-Crosby article arguing invalidity of Massa-
chusetts Burma Law because of preemption); David Schmahmann &James Finch,
The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Busi-
ness Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997) (same).
97. Such an argument has been made by the Chief Counsel of the House
International Affairs Committee at the time the Federal Burma Law was enacted,
who has stated that, "[t]he idea that the sponsors of the federal legislation to sanc-
tion Burma intended to preempt states from adopting parallel and complementary
legislation is just preposterous." Audio tape: Panel on International Law and the
Work of Federal and State Governments, held by American Society of Interna-
tional Law (April 4-7, 2001) (International Video Corporation, Sterling, VA) (state-
ment of Stephen Rademaker, Chief Counsel, House Committee on International
Relations).
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of implied preemption.9" Whether preemption principles were "settled"
in a way that rendered the state law invalid without an express preemption
provision is debatable, to put it mildly.99 More importantly for present
purposes, if Congress did reason as the Court speculates, then it appears
to have been trying to escape accountability for its actions. The reasons
given by the Court for concluding that the Massachusetts law posed an
obstacle to the achievement of Congress' full purposes may well have led
many members of Congress to prefer that the Massachusetts law not stand.
If so, and if Congress did form an intent to preempt state laws such as
Massachusetts', as the Court suggested in Crosby, then the likely reason
Congress relied on "implied" preemption doctrine rather than express
preemption was the perceived political unpopularity of preempting such
human rights sanctions. The political theory that underlies the accounta-
bility critique of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine would condemn a
preemption holding in such circumstances. The desire of Congress to es-
cape accountability reflects a lack of popular support for preempting the
Massachusetts law, and, in a democracy, a measure that lacks the popular
support necessary to get enacted is not law. If members of Congress
wanted the courts to hold the statute invalid on the basis of well estab-
lished "implied" preemption law but were unwilling to vote for an express
preemption provision, then they were seeking to escape the accountability
that the critics of federal common law regard as central to democratic
legitimacy.
In sum, those who regard accountability as the touchstone of preemp-
tion doctrine and value the political safeguards of federalism should ob-
ject as much to the variety of implied preemption involved in Crosby as to
federal common law or dormant foreign affairs doctrine. In both cases,
state law is being displaced in the face of congressional silence, and it is
difficult to hold anyone accountable for silence. Finding preemption on
the basis of ambiguous silence circumvents the political safeguards of fed-
eralism. As Professor Tribe writes in his treatise, "to give state-displacing
weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the
very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect state
interests." 110
98. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387-88.
99. Most commentators regarded the preemption doctrine to be in disarray.
See BetsyJ. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies,
77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 588 (1997); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 700-01 (1991); SusanJ. Stabile, Preemption of
State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1995). Those who did think preemption law was clear believed that the Court
had established a strong presumption against preemption. See, e.g., Ronald Ro-
tunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CONST. COMM. 311, 312 (1988);
Denning & McCall, supra note 96, at 322; Ernest Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 173 (2001).
100. 1 TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1176 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 467 U.S. 528 (1985)). Tribe made the same point in the second
edition of his treatise, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 480 (2d
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If Congress did indeed think that such state laws posed an intolerable
obstacle to the achievement of its Full purposes, the more likely explana-
tion for its decision to remain silent was its confidence that the statute
would be found invalid because of the well-established law concerning the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. If so, then the Federal Burma Law implicitly
approves of dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Of course, critics of the doc-
trine who stress accountability would not be satisfied with such silent ap-
proval. For the reasons just discussed, however, they should be just as
unsatisfied with the Court's decision that the Massachusetts Burma Law
was preempted in the face of ambiguous silence from Congress. In any
event, the possibility that Congress may have relied on Zschernig in assum-
ing that state laws such as Massachusetts' were invalid is a strong reason to
retain some version of the Zschernig doctrine on stare decisis grounds.1 °"'
The final alternative, of course, is that Congress did not mean to pre-
empt the Massachusetts law, or others similar to it. ' 0 2 In other words, Con-
gress may have expected the President to do his best to bring about
democracy in Burma within the constraints imposed by state laws that he
might prefer did not exist. The Court cited no convincing reason to attri-
bute to Congress intent to remove inconvenient state laws. 103 The reality,
of course, is that Congress, as an institution, cannot be expected to have
had a unitary intent on this question. Some members of Congress may
have had no intent at all on the issue. Some might have preferred to re-
tain the state laws, while others might have preferred to remove the obsta-
cles. It is likely that the Federal Burma Law reflects a compromise
between those who wanted to do more to promote democracy in Burma
and those who wanted to do less, or between those who wanted to give the
ed. 1988), where he added a footnote explaining why the federal law imposing
sanctions on South Africa should not be understood to preempt state and local
sanctions. See id. at 480 n.12. Massachusetts argued in Crosby that a congressional
intent to preempt state Burma sanctions should not be read into the federal
Burma law because most commentators and courts had regarded the federal sanc-
tions against South Africa not to preempt state sanctions against that country. The
Court rejected that argument on the ground that it had never addressed the pre-
emptive effect of the federal law imposing sanctions on South Africa. Crosby, 530
U.S. at 388. This invocation of its own supremacy in interpreting federal statutes
missed the point, however. Even an interpretation of the statute by less exalted
interpreters, such as Professor Tribe, see supra note 96, might be probative of
whether Congress regarded the Federal Burma Law as preemptive of state sanctions.
101. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging adherence to Hans v. Louisiana
because of "the difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the intervening
law that has been based" on Hans, and observing that "it is impossible to say how
many extant statutes would have included an explicit preclusion of suits against
states if it had not been thought that such suits were automatically barred" by
Hans), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
102. See supra note 97 (discussing statement of Stephen Rademaker).
103. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388 (noting congressional silence about state
sanctions).
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President more flexibility in achieving democracy in Burma and those who
wanted to give him less.
The Court's increasing reluctance to interpret statutes so as to ad-
vance Congress' perceived purposes reflects its recognition that Congress
usually lacks a unitary purpose, and that statutes generally reflect either a
decision to go so far and no further in achieving a given end, or a lack of
political will to go further. This recognition seems to underlie the Court's
increasingly stringent approach to implying private rights of action under
federal statutes. In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 104 the Court adopted an ap-
proach to this question reminiscent of its approach to preemption in
Crosby: a private right of action would be implied if it would promote com-
pliance with the statute and in that way advance Congress' purpose in en-
acting the statute. 1'0 5 Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of
Chicago'0 6 argued that Congress' failure to include a private right of action
simply may have reflected the desire that the statutory purpose be
achieved by certain means and not others, or to some extent and no fur-
ther.10 7 This view prevails today to the point that "many cases view the
question of implied remedies . . .as one exclusively of legislative intent
demonstrated in text or legislative history [an approach] that ordinarily
leads to a finding of no implication."H) 8 As Judge Posner has observed,
the movement towards a rule against implied causes of action "parallels
the shift in scholarly thinking about legislation from a rather naive faith in
the public-interest character of most legislation to a more realistic under-
standing of the importance of interest groups in the legislative pro-
cess .... [I]f the statute is just the result of a clash of interest groups,
adding remedies to those expressly provided in the statute may upset the
compromise."' 0 9
104. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
105. SeeJ.l Case, 377 U.S. at 433 (noting that it is court's duty to effectuate
congressional purpose).
106. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
107. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 610 n.2 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring);
FALLON ET AL., supra note 51, at 842 (discussing implication of private rights of
action); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45-51 (1984) (discussing interest groups
and private rights of action).
108. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 51, at 840. But cf Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179
("Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require evidence that
Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the creation of
a private cause of action. The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual
dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when Congress simply for-
got to codify its evident intention to provide a cause of action.").
109. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 271-72
(1985), cited in Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 901, n.237
(1996) (recognizing view of legislation as logrolling).
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In the preemption area, the same insight has led the Court to move in
a similar direction, I" and to apply in many cases a presumption against
preemption.' I Although the Court in Crosby purported to be reserving
the question whether the presumption is applicable in a case such as this,
its approach to preemption simply cannot be reconciled with any such
presumption. It is apparent that the Court viewed this as a case warranting
a less rigorous application of preemption doctrine than is evident in its
other preemption decisions.1 12 Below, I argue that the Court's approach
to preemption in Crosby was so conducive to the displacement of state law
that it would have yielded the conclusion that the Massachusetts law was
preempted even if there had been no Federal Burma Law. The Court's
holding would have been narrower if the Court had decided the case on
the basis of the dormant foreign affairs power. Indeed, the decision is best
understood as a sort of dormant foreign affairs decision. In the absence of
direct evidence that Congress intended to preempt the Massachusetts law,
the real work in this case was performed by the factors that led the Court
to apply the presumption against preemption less rigorously. One need
not look far below the surface of the opinion to see that the Court's un-
usually receptive approach to preemption is attributable to the foreign af-
fairs aspects of the case.
III. CRosBYs EXCEPTIONALISM
Critics of dormant foreign affairs doctrine frequently criticize this
doctrine's sharp differentiation between domestic and foreign affairs.1"'
Such foreign affairs exceptionalism is both untenable and indefensible.
With globalization, they argue, the distinction between foreign affairs and
domestic affairs becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.' 14 In any
event, the Constitution does not require that foreign affairs be treated dif-
ferently than domestic affairs.1 15 The same general approaches should
apply to both. Because dormant foreign affairs doctrine rests ultimately
on such a distinction, it should be rejected. I consider the merits of this
110. See KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE
APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIIATION 34-39 (1991);
Nelson, supra note 62, at 265-90 (criticizing obstacle preemption on these
grounds). But cf infra note 229(discussing Geier).
111. See Rotunda, supra note 99, at 311-12 (examining presumption against
preemption); see also Clark, supra note 93, at 1427-30.
112. SeeYoung, supra note 99, at 173; cf United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
108 (2000) ("As Rice indicates, an 'assumption' of nonpre-emption is not triggered
when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence.").
113. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1670-71; Young, supra
note 99, at 175-76 (2001).
114. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1670; Goldsmith, Statu-
tory Foreign Affairs, supra note 16, 203; Spiro, supra note 8, at 1223; Young, supra
note 99, at 175.
115. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 8, at 343.
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argument for rejecting Zschernig in Part IV. In this Part, I consider
whether Crosby lends support to the critics of foreign affairs
exceptionalism.
On the surface, the Crosby decision appears to move in the direction
urged by such critics. The Court pointedly declined to address the dor-
mant foreign affairs and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause arguments
on which the lower courts had primarily rested." 1 6 Instead, it purported
to decide the case on the basis of "settled" preemption doctrine.1 17 In-
deed, it denied that it was treating this case differently even to the extent
of denying the state the benefit of a presumption against preemption. 118
By avoiding the doctrines that treat foreign affairs differently from domes-
tic affairs, and relying instead on "settled" preemption rules that apply
equally in purely domestic cases, the Court seemed to be signaling its aver-
sion to foreign affairs exceptionalism.
A closer look reveals a different picture. First, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Federal Burma Law as precluding Massachusetts from following
a procurement policy that similarly-situated private actors are perfectly
free to adopt cuts distinctly against the grain of the Court's recent deci-
sions on constitutional federalism. These latter decisions, indeed, suggest
that the Federal Burma Law, as construed by the Court, may be unconsti-
tutional. Perhaps the Court does not regard these federalism principles to
be applicable in the foreign affairs area. Or perhaps the foreign affairs
aspects of the case blinded the Court to this tension with its federalism
cases. Either way, the Court is, at least subconsciously, continuing to treat
foreign affairs cases differently from those it perceives as primarily
domestic.
Second, even leaving aside the apparent conflict with the Court's con-
stitutional federalism decisions, and notwithstanding the Court's denial of
distinct treatment, Crosby reflects a brand of preemption analysis that is far
from ordinary. The Court applies the "obstacle" preemption standard as
loosely as it did in Crosby only when the states have legislated in an area of
uniquely federal interest. Crosby is such a case because it involves foreign
affairs.
A. Crosby and Constitutional Federalism
One surprising aspect of the Court's decision was its cavalier dismissal
of Massachusetts' argument that its law was valid because it concerned how
the state would spend its own money. In its response to the plaintiffs'
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause claim, Massachusetts pitched this ar-
116. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000).
117. See id. at 388.
118. See id. at 374 n.8 (reserving question of applicability of presumption
against preemption).
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gument under the rubric of the "market-participant" exception.' I19 The
parties debated whether Massachusetts' conduct fell within that exception,
and whether the exception applied at all to dormant foreign commerce
and dormant foreign affairs claims. 120 While the applicability of the mar-
ket-participant exception to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause was
perhaps debatable, 121 the fact that Massachusetts was merely deciding how
to spend its own money seemed relevant as well to the preemption claim,
albeit in a distinct way.
The Court dismissed the market participation argument in a brief
footnote, citing Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
v. Gould Inc. 122 for the proposition that the mere fact that the Massachu-
setts Burma Law was an exercise of the state's spending power does not
exempt the statute from preemption analysis. 1 2 3 Even if it did not exempt
the Massachusetts law from preemption analysis, however, the fact that
Massachusetts was establishing a policy for the expenditure of state funds
in purchasing goods and services was surely relevant to the preemption
analysis. The Court neglected to consider this possibility.
Under preemption analysis, the ultimate question is whether, in light
of the purposes Congress was seeking to advance, it can be inferred that
Congress would not have wanted the state statute to stand. 12 4 The Court
in Crosby concluded that the Massachusetts Burma Law posed an obstacle
to the full achievement of Congress' purposes. 125 But this conclusion is in
tension, to say the least, with the fact that the federal statute does not
purport to prohibit private companies or individuals from doing precisely
what the State of Massachusetts sought to do. Mobil Oil Company and Bill
Gates are perfectly free, as far as the Federal Burma Law is concerned, to
establish a policy identical to the one established by Massachusetts to de-
termine from whom it would procure its goods and services. They may
even do so expressly for the purpose of promoting democracy in
119. See Brief for Petitioners at 25-36, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474) (arguing Burma law is not regulation).
120. Compare id. at 25-29 (applying market participation to both dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause and foreign affairs claims), with Brief for Respondents at
36-42, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474)
(arguing that Commonwealth is "market regulator").
121. See Denning & McCall, supra note 96, at 311 (discussing applicability of
market participant exception to Massachusetts Burma Law).
122. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
123. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.7.
124. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (recognizing that
congressional purpose is touchstone in preemption cases); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (same); Cade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgt. Ass'n, 505
U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (same); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-38
(1990) (same); Gould, 475 U.S. at 290 (same); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (same); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978) (same). See generally Nelson, supra note 55, at 276-77 & n.167.
125. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366 (stating that Burma law frustrates federal statu-
tory objectives).
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Burma.1 26 The Massachusetts Burma Law interferes with the achievement
of the full purposes of the Federal Burma Law in no qualitatively different
way than does the identical policy by Mobil Oil or Bill Gates. If Congress
opted to allow the latter to establish such policies, then it seems difficult to
conclude that the states' identical policy poses an intolerable obstacle to
the accomplishment of Congress' purposes.
Indeed, the Courts' recent constitutional federalism decisions suggest
that the Federal Burma Law, as the Court construed it, may be unconstitu-
tional. In New York v. United States,127 the Court held that Congress lacks
the power to impose on states the obligation to enact or administer a fed-
eral regulatory scheme. 128 This is the so-called anti-commandeering rule.
The Court distinguished Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity129 on the ground that the latter case involved a federal statute that
imposed on states the same obligations it imposed on similarly-situated
private parties. 13 ' The Court thus seemed to establish a safe harbor for
federal statutes that impose on states the same obligations as on private
individuals, exempting such statutes from the anti-commandeering rule.
In United States v. Printz,t 31 the Court suggested that even federal statutes
that subject states and private individuals to the same regulations might be
invalid under some circumstances. 132 Some lower courts read these deci-
sions as calling into question any federal statute that imposes regulations
only on states, or otherwise subjects states to different regulations than
private individuals. 133 In Reno v. Condon,134 the Court expressly left open
the question whether a federal law that regulates only states is invalid for
that reason. 135 This is the so-called requirement of general applicability.
126. Although the directors of a private company who act for purely altruistic
reasons, ignoring the economic interests of their shareholders, might be violating
their fiduciary duty, it is widely recognized that altruism may be good for business
in the long term and thus consistent with the business judgment rule. See Viet D.
Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise,
24 J. CORP. L. 975, 984 n.70 (1999). To the extent the business judgment rule
would pose an obstacle to such altruism, however, it would do so as a matter of
state law, fully alterable by the state itself.
127. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
128. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61.
129. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
130. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
131. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
132. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 n.17.
133. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 461 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that Con-
gress may only subject states to legislation also applicable to private parties), rev'd,
528 U.S. 141 (2000). But see Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that Fourth Circuit, not Supreme Court, created requirement of general
applicability).
134. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
135. See Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. If the Court ultimately rejects the require-
ment of general applicability, then presumably a federal law that subjects states to
distinct treatment would be invalid in the same circumstances as a law that is gen-
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The Court may well decide that there is no requirement of general
applicability when Congress regulates conduct that only states engage in,
at least if Congress imposes on the states regulations of a negative charac-
ter. But a decision rendered the Term before Crosby was handed down
suggests that, where Congress regulates conduct in which both states and
private parties engage, Congress may not subject states to more onerous
regulations than private parties. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Board,136 the Court rejected the "consent" theory
for finding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity that the Court had
articulated in Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Depart-
ment.' 3 7 The Court had held in Parden that, where states engage in activi-
ties that can be regulated by Congress, Congress might condition the
states' continued participation in such activities on their waiver of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. 138 The theory was that, if Congress could
have forbidden the states from engaging in the activity altogether, it can
take the lesser step of permitting the states to engage in such activity only
if they waive their immunity. 13
9
The Court in College Savings Bank overruled Parden.14°1 Exactly which
aspects of the reasoning of the Parden case the Court rejected is not en-
tirely clear. One possibility is that it rejected the idea that the greater
power to prohibit state conduct entirely includes the lesser power of con-
ditioning the state's ability to engage in such conduct on its waiver of im-
munity. That this is what the Court held is suggested by its emphasis on
the need for a state's waiver of immunity to be voluntary, and its sugges-
tion that Congress coerces the waiver when it makes such waiver a condi-
tion of the state's ability to engage in "otherwise lawful activity."1 4 1 In this
view, an "otherwise lawful activity" is an activity that states may lawfully
engage in but for a statute purporting to prohibit them from engaging in
the activity unless they waive their immunity. College Savings Bank might
thus be read to hold that, even if Congress may prohibit the state from
engaging in certain activity altogether, it may not condition a state's ability
to engage in such conduct on its waiver of immunity.
This interpretation is highly problematic, however, as it potentially
places states in a disadvantageous position. Faced with a choice between
permitting states to engage in such activity with their sovereign immunity
intact and prohibiting the states from engaging in the activity altogether,
erally applicable. What exactly the test is after Reno is a matter of considerable
uncertainty.
136. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
137. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
138. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 196-
97 (1964), overruled by Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
139. See id. at 192.
140. See Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 660 (expressly overruling Parden).
141. Id. at 687.
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Congress may well opt for the latter. If it does, then the proffered inter-
pretation of College Savings Bank would make states worse off: the states
may prefer to purchase permission to engage in the activity with their sov-
ereign immunity, but College Savings Bank, so interpreted, would deny
them this option.
Professors Berman, Reese and Young have offered an alternative in-
terpretation of College Savings Bank that would avoid this problem. They
would read College Savings Bank as distinguishing between a condition im-
posed purely as a penalty for a state's failure to waive immunity and a
condition that Congress sincerely regarded as a reasonable second-best so-
lution to the problem it faced, given that the preferred solution (abroga-
tion of immunity) was unavailable.' 42 The former sort of condition would
be invalid while the latter would be valid. They apply their theory to test
the validity of a bill that has been introduced by Senator Leahy to address
the Court's invalidation of Congress' abrogation of state sovereign immu-
nity in the patent laws. The Leahy Bill provides, inter alia, that states are
ineligible to obtain patents for their inventions unless they waive their im-
munity from patent suits. 143 Under the theory of Professors Berman,
Reese and Young, this provision would be invalid if state ineligibility for
patents were imposed purely as a penalty for failure to waive immunity-
that is, if Congress would not really want states that refuse to waive their
immunity to be ineligible for patents. 144 They acknowledge the difficulty
of ascertaining congressional intent on such a counterfactual, but they ar-
gue that one can infer what Congress would have wanted from an analysis
of whether Congress "would... actually have a reason for denying federal
intellectual property protection from recalcitrant states other than to in-
duce other states to play along." 145 In the view of Professors Berman,
Reese and Young, the Leahy Bill may be valid under their test because
denying states patent rights enjoyed by private parties may be a reasonable
mechanism for leveling the playing field between states and private parties
who engage in similar conduct.
It is impossible to do justice here to the subtle and elaborately de-
fended argument of Professors Berman, Reese and Young. I merely raise
some concerns. First, their suggestion that leveling the playing field be-
tween states and private parties would be a valid federal policy runs
squarely against the Court's reasoning in College Savings Bank, where the
Court said that "' [e]venhandedness' between individuals and States is not
to be expected: 'The constitutional role of the States sets them apart from
142. See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Ac-
countability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid
(And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1157-58 (2001).
143. S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999).
144. See Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 142, at 1157.
145. Id. at 1158. That they view this as a basis for inferring congressional
intent is indicated at id. at 1159.
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other employers and defendants."' 146 Second, the distinction between a
condition imposed as a penalty and a condition that Congress sincerely
regards as a second-best solution to the problem at hand finds little sup-
port in the College Savings Bank opinion. Professors Berman, Reese and
Young emphasize that the Court in that case distinguished voluntary from
coerced waivers, 147 but this distinction does not correspond to the distinc-
tion between a penalty and a second-best solution. In the federalism con-
text, the Court typically distinguishes between coercion and mere pressure
or encouragement, 48 a test that seems to depend on the extent to which
the state's will is likely to be overborne. The characteristics that distin-
guish a penalty from a second-best solution do not appear to correspond
to those that distinguish coercion From mere encouragement. Congress
may well have a valid reason for insisting on a condition under the
Berman/Reese/Young theory, yet the condition might still be impossible
as a practical matter for the states to refuse."49 Professors Berman, Reese
and Young correctly note that there is little in the concept of coercion to
justify the Court's conclusion that "exclusion of the State from otherwise
lawful activity" automatically passes the point where pressure turns into
compulsion.' 50 But their alternative seems similarly unrelated to the con-
cept of voluntariness.
The Court's analysis in College Savings Bank seems more compatible
with an alternative test. On this alternative view, the Court did not reject
the idea that the greater power to prohibit states from engaging in a given
activity includes the lesser power to condition the state's ability to engage
in the activity on its waiver of sovereign immunity. Rather, the Court
found the principle inapplicable because Congress lacked the power to
prohibit states from engaging in the activity at issue in the case. "Greater-
power-includes-the-lesser" arguments have played a central role in other
federalism decisions, which the Court did not purport to disturb in College
Savings Bank. 15' Moreover, the Court in College Savings Bank explicitly
distinguished congressional attempts to purchase waiver pursuant to the
Spending Clause, as well as the conditioning of approval of an inter-state
146. See CoIl. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 685-86 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dept. of
Highway & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)).
147. See Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 142, at 1169.
148. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
149. Cf, Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard, Printz and the Treaty Power, 70 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 1317, 1337 (1998) (discussing validity as conditional preemption of
statute prohibiting states from arresting aliens unless they agree to give them noti-
fication required by Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; such prohibition
seems necessary and proper means of complying with international obligations im-
posed by Convention, yet the condition is one that states would have difficulty
refusing).
150. See Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 142, at 1169.
151. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 174.
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compact on waiver of immunity. 152 In both cases,,the Court said, the pres-
sure on the states to waive immunity was exerted through the withholding
of a "gratuity."' 53 These aspects of the Court's analysis suggests that the
Court was rejecting Parden's first premise, not its second-that the Court
was saying, in other words, that Congress lacked the power to prohibit the
states from engaging in the activity it was (conditionally) prohibiting them
from engaging in.
One version of this argument is that Congress lacks the power to im-
pose any obligations on the states; if the Constitution itself does not pro-
hibit states from engaging in a given activity, then states are
constitutionally entitled to engage in it. 1 54 This version is implausibly
broad, however. Even under the regime of National League of Cities v.
Usery,155 since rejected as too restrictive of federal power, 156 Congress had
the power to impose obligations on the states in certain areas. A more
limited version is more plausible: States are constitutionally entitled to en-
gage in any activity in which private parties are free to engage. Congress
lacks the power to prohibit the states from engaging in such activity unless
it also prohibits private parties from engaging in the activity, and for this
reasons it lacks the power to condition the states' ability to engage in such
activity on their waiver of immunity. On this view, "otherwise lawful activ-
ity" is activity that may lawfully be engaged in by private parties. That this
is what the Court held is suggested by the Court's statement that "even-
handedness between individuals and States is not to be expected."' 57 The
upshot of this interpretation of College Savings Bank, after all, is that states
are constitutionally entitled to engage in any conduct that private persons
are entitled to engage in, but, unlike private parties, they are constitution-
ally entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court's recognition that states
enjoy this constitutionally-protected advantage strongly suggests that Con-
gress may not impose greater burdens on the states than on private individ-
uals performing the identical activities.
College Savings Bank thus appears to dovetail with the New York/Printz/
Condon line of cases to establish, as a constitutional matter, a sort of mar-
ket-participant exception to preemption doctrine. As discussed above, the
Court in Crosby construed the Federal Burma Law to prohibit states from
adopting a policy on procurement of goods and services that similarly-
152. See Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686-87 (1999).
153. Id.
154. Cf. Constitutional Law-State Sovereign Immunity-Seventh Circuit Holds, that
States Waive Sovereign Immunity by Arbitrating Interconnection Agreements Under the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 144 HARV. L. REv. 1819, 1819 (2001) (interpreting Col-
lege Savings Bank this way).
155. 426 U.S. 833, 835 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 467 U.S. 528 (1985).
156. Garcia, 467 U.S. at 528.
157. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 685.
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situated private parties were perfectly free to adopt. This may well be
unconstitutional.
Whether College Savings Bank replaced Parden with this test or some
other is of course highly debatable. The decision raises more questions
than it answers. More generally, the line between the invalid comman-
deering of the states and valid preemption of state law is in need of greater
clarification. 158 This is not the place to attempt to resolve these questions.
I discuss these cases here only to suggest that it is noteworthy that the
Court in Crosby did not even allude to them. Even if College Savings Bank
were not amenable to the reading I outline above, other cases clearly high-
lighted the potential constitutional problems with a federal law that sin-
gles out the states for regulation, and Condon expressly left open the
constitutionality of such laws. The relevance of this line of cases to the
statutory interpretation cases was made clear to the Court in the state's
brief, as well as an amicus brief.'5 9 That the Court did not see the need to
refer to these issues even in passing may suggest that it did not believe
these principles of constitutional federalism to be applicable in the for-
eign relations area. 6 "
An alternative explanation is that the Court simply overlooked the
connection between the issues involved in Crosby and its recent comman-
deering and sovereign immunity decisions. Either alternative is nearly as
consistent with foreign affairs exceptionalism as an explicit reliance on
dormant foreign affairs doctrine would have been. The view that constitu-
tional federalism principles do not apply in the foreign affairs area is one
of the key complaints of the critics of foreign affairs exceptionalism.161 If
158. For a discussion of the relationship between these two concepts, see V,'z
quez, supra note 149, at 1344-50.
159. See Brief of Petitioners at 16-17, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) (arguing that "[s]elective purchasing laws are in their essence
local measures resembling private boycotts, and the Court should not presume
that Congress intended to impose greater limits on state and local governments
than on private persons" (citing, inter alia, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
177-78 (1992), for the proposition thai "generally applicable federal laws do not
present same issues of federalism as laws that single out the States")); see also Ami-
cus Brief of the Members of Congress in Support of Petitioners and for Reversal at
19-22, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (2000 WL
27691); Brief of Amicus Curiae Earthrights International Supporting the Appeal of
Defendants/Appellants Laskey and Anderson Urging Reversal at 9, Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council v. Laskey, No. 98-2304 (1st Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) ("The Tenth Amend-
ment..., frowns upon laws that seek to regulate States without applying identical
restrictions to private parties."). The Court in Crosby indicated that the respon-
dents had conceded that Congress had the power to preempt the Massachusetts
Burma Law. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n. 7
(2000). But to concede that Congress has the power to preempt the Massachusetts
Burma Law is not to concede that it may do so in a law that singles out the states
for regulation.
160. Cf Mark Tushnet, Globalism and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36
TULSA L.J. 11, 21 (2000).
161. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 390 (1998).
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the Court overlooked the connection between this case and its federalism
jurisprudence, it likely did so because it viewed Crosby as a "foreign af-
fairs" case rather than a "federalism" case. Of course, it was both. The
Court's apparent neglect of the federalism aspects of the case suggests
that, if only subconsciously, the Court continues to treat federalism issues
distinctly in cases in which foreign affairs considerations predominate.
B. Crosby's Exceptional Approach to Preemption
As discussed above, Congress was silent on the question of preempt-
ing state sanctions against Burma. 162 The Court nevertheless found that
the Federal Burma Law preempted such state laws under "settled" princi-
ples of implied preemption. 163 The Court applied the "obstacle preemp-
tion" branch of preemption jurisprudence and concluded that the
Massachusetts law was preempted because it posed an obstacle to the
achievement of Congress' full purposes and objectives in enacting the Fed-
eral Burma Law. Contrary to the Court's suggestion in Crosby, however,
the Court's approach to preemption in that case was far from ordinary.
"Obstacle" preemption is sometimes regarded as a branch of "con-
flict" preemption, which is typically distinguished from "express" preemp-
tion. 164 In the absence of express preemption, state statutes will be
regarded as preempted if they conflict with federal law.' 615 One way state
and federal law can conflict is if it is physically impossible for persons to
comply with both. Some have suggested that this is the only circumstance
in which the Court should find a conflict warranting preemption.' 16
These commentators regard obstacle preemption as different from con-
flict preemption (and object to it). Other commentators, however, treat
"physical impossibility" as just one of "two ways to determine whether a
state law is preempted because'it actually conflicts with federal law.""
67
The second way state law might "actually conflict[ ]" with federal law is
"where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
162. For further discussion of congressional silence on the Massachusetts
Burma Law, see supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
163. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387-88.
164. See Nelson, supra note 55, at 226-28.
165. See id. at 227-28.
166. See id. at 230-31 & n.23 (citing commentators taking this position). This
formulation is too narrow. Clearly, the Massachusetts law would conflict with a
federal law that gave private parties a right to deal with Burma to the extent not
prohibited by federal law, even though technically such a federal law would not
expressly preempt any state laws, and even though private parties can technically
comply with both. Perhaps these commentators would regard this as an example
of express preemption because the express creation of a "right" to deal with
Burma could have no other purpose than to displace state laws that deny or bur-
den the right. Because there is no reference in this hypothetical federal law to
state laws being preempted, however, I would regard this as an example of conflict
preemption.
167. See Rotunda, supra note 99, at 317.
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purposes and objectives of Congress."168 These latter commentators, how-
ever, read the Court's pre-Crosby decisions as reflecting "the extreme reluc-
tance of the modern Court to find preemption." 169 This extreme
reluctance was nowhere in evidence in Crosby, where the Court found the
state law to be preempted with nary a trace of actual conflict.
The Court's mode of analysis in finding that the Massachusetts Burma
Law posed an obstacle to the achievement of Congress' full purposes and
objectives was, indeed, so conducive to a finding of preemption that it
would have yielded the same result even if there had been no Federal
Burma Law. The reasons the Court gave for objecting to the Massachu-
setts Burma Law would have been equally compelling in light of the dele-
gation of foreign affairs power to the President in the Constitution itself
and in other, more general federal statutes. The Court described three
ways in which the Massachusetts law posed an obstacle to the achievement
of Congress' purposes. I discuss these here in a different order than the
Court did.
1. The Breadth of Massachusetts' Sanctions
One respect in which the Massachusetts law conflicted with the fed-
eral law, according to the Court, was that the former imposed sanctions on
a broader range of conduct than the latter. 17° "Congress manifestly in-
tended to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government to a
specific range."'' "Sanctions are drawn not only to bar what they pro-
hibit but to allow what they permit, and the inconsistency of sanctions
here undermines the congressional calibration of force." 172
It is of course true that the federal law reflects a decision by Congress
to impose sanctions on Burma only to a limited extent. Thus, the sanc-
tions not prohibited by the Federal Burma Law are permitted as far as
federal law is concerned. The Court, however, offered no evidence that Con-
gress intended to prohibit the states from imposing more stringent sanc-
tions as a matter of state law. 173  On this question, Congress was
168. Id. at 317; see also Nelson, supra note 55, at 228 & n.14.
169. See Rotunda, supra note 99, at 317. But cf infra note 229 (discussing pos-
sible departures from presumption in the purely domestic context).
170. See id. at 378-79. In the remainder of this Part, I shall follow the Court in
characterizing the Massachusetts law as one imposing sanctions on certain entities
doing business with Burma. I express no view on whether a state's procurement
decisions should be subject to invalidation under the Zschernig doctrine. See also
infra note 313 (reserving question whether state procurement policies qualify as
"sanctions" for Z7chernig purposes).
171. Id. at 377.
172. Id. at 380.
173. In addition to noting the differences in scope between the two laws,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378-80 (2000), the Court
cited statements from the legislative history that indicated that Congress acted de-
liberately in limiting the federal sanctions to a narrower range. See Crosby, 530 U.S.
at 378 n.13. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, it is unsurprising
that Congress acted deliberately in limiting the federal sanctions as it did. See id. at
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"silent."174 The Court appears to have inferred such intent merely from
the fact that Congress decided not to go as far as Massachusetts had gone.
But, as the Court said in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,'75
"this difference poses, rather than disposes of the [preemption] prob-
lem." 176 If the federal law had forbidden all of the conduct that triggered
the Massachusetts sanctions, there would have been no case to adjudicate.
If the mere fact that the federal law prohibited a narrower range of con-
duct were enough to warrant preemption, then federal law on a given sub-
ject would always preempt state law when it did not render it
superfluous. 177 Cases too numerous to mention show that a federal law
that goes only so far does not ipso facto preempt state laws that go
further.1
78
Moreover, if the fact that the sanctions imposed by federal law ap-
plied to a narrower range of conduct than those imposed by Massachusetts
presented a conflict worthy of preemption, then the Massachusetts law
would, a fortiori, have been preempted if there had been no federal law
imposing sanctions on Burma. If the Massachusetts law conflicted with the
federal law imposing sanctions on Burma because it imposed sanctions on
a broader range of conduct, then it would have conflicted even more with a
federal statutory regime imposing no sanctions on Burma. A rule under
which state sanctions against a given country are preempted whenever the
federal government has failed to impose sanctions on that country, how-
ever, would be a species of dormant foreign affairs preemption.
It is of course true that the absence of a law imposing sanctions on a
country might just reflect Congress' failure to focus its attention on that
country. Preemption in such circumstances could not be based on a "cali-
bration of force" theory. Still, the Court's analysis would appear to war-
rant preemption when Congress has focused its attention on a particular
country and opted not to impose sanctions. The alternative would be to
say that, if Congress determines that federal sanctions are unwarranted,
the state sanctions stand unless Congress affirmatively enacts a law pre-
389. That, however, does not imply that they meant to preclude the states from
going further.
174. See id. at 388.
175. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
176. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141.
177. Cf STARR, supra note 110, at 36 ("If every state law affecting one of the
many interests reconciled by a particular federal statute were preempted under a
delicate balance theory, there would seem to be little if any room for state regula-
tory authority.").
178. For example, Congress' enactment of a statute imposing a substantive
standard of conduct in a given field, but not providing for a private right of action,
is commonly understood to leave available state rights of action for the enforce-
ment of the federal standard. See, for example, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470 (1996), which was unanimous on this point. But cf STARR, supra note 110, at
27-29 (describing, and criticizing, holding of International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987), which takes an approach reminiscent of this part of Crosby).
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empting the state sanctions. 179 Such a rule would be highly anomalous: it
would mean that, where Congress decides that some sanctions are war-
ranted, state sanctions can be impliedly preempted, but where Congress
decides that no sanctions are warranted-a position that departs further
from the state policy-state sanctions stand unless expressly preempted. Of
course, there are Chadha problems with finding state sanctions preempted
by Congress' decision not to act, but, as discussed in Part II, similar
problems have not deterred the Court from taking congressional inaction
into account in other contexts.
In any event, the best way to avoid the Chadha problems would be to
adopt a blanket rule against state sanctions. If preemption is warranted
when Congress has focused its attention on a given country and decided to
impose less stringent sanctions or no sanctions at all, then state sanctions
should be preempted when Congress has failed to focus its attention on a
given country. Congress' failure to give any attention to a particular re-
gime presumably reflects its view at some level that the problems posed by
such a regime are not sufficiently grave to warrant its attention. A state law
imposing stringent sanctions would seem to be in greater conflict with this
implicitjudgment than with a federal law imposing less stringent sanctions
on the same country. If the discrepancy between the federal and state
policies warranted preemption in the latter case, then the greater discrep-
ancy between the two policies warrants preemption in the former case a
fortiori.
Of course, the federal government's decision not to impose federal
sanctions may reflect its acquiescence in the state sanctions. With no indi-
cation that Congress objected to the state sanctions, the federal govern-
ment's decision to enact sanctions that are narrower in scope than existing
state sanctions isjust as consistent with acquiescence in the continued exis-
tence of broader state sanctions. This just shows that, to the extent the
Court relied on this factor, it did not rely on congressional intent, either
actual or fairly imputed.
In sum, the Court's reliance on the comparative breadth of the Massa-
chusetts sanctions suggests either of two possible approaches to preemp-
tion of state sanctions. The first possibility is that the nonexistence of
federal sanctions would be similarly probative of preemption. This would
represent the adoption of a species of foreign affairs preemption. The
second possibility is that the imposition of federal sanctions that are less
stringent than the state sanctions would be probative of preemption, but
the absence of a federal law imposing sanctions would not be. Even if the
Court adopted this second approach, its approach to preemption in the
context of state sanctions against foreign states would diverge sharply from
its approach in other contexts, where a similar discrepancy between state
and federal law poses the preemption question but does not help answer
179. See Swaine, supra note 16, at 504.
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it. 8 0  To that extent, at least, Crosby perpetuates foreign affairs
exceptionalism. 18 1
2. Presidential Flexibility
In the Court's view, the Massachusetts Burma Law also posed an ob-
stacle to the achievement of Congress' intention to "provide the President
with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions against
Burma."18 2 The Massachusetts Burma Law was in conflict with the Federal
Burma Law because the latter conferred "as much discretion to exercise
economic leverage against Burma ... as our law will admit."
'83
This portion of the Court's analysis is in substantial tension with its
reasoning in the portion of the opinion just discussed. There, the Court
stressed the narrowness of the sanctions authorized by Congress, at least as
compared with those imposed by Massachusetts. If Congress in fact con-
strained the President's flexibility to deal with the Burma problem when it
enacted the Federal Burma Law, then the Court's focus on presidential
flexibility suggests that the Massachusetts Burma Law would have been
preempted, a fortiori, in the absence of the Federal Burma Law. In any
event, a congressional intent to enhance the President's flexibility in deal-
ing with the Burma problem does not justify an inference that Congress
intended to preempt state sanctions. The Court's reasoning in this portion
of its opinion is based on the same logical fallacy that critics of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine ascribe to the defenders of that doctrine.
As the Court recognized in the part of the opinion relying on Con-
gress' calibration of force, the Federal Burma Law actually placed signifi-
cant limits on the President's flexibility in dealing with Burma. The
federal law made the imposition of sanctions on Burma mandatory under
certain circumstances, and it specified the factors the President must take
into account in determining whether to impose other sanctions and to lift
the sanctions imposed.'8 4 Moreover, the federal law limited the sorts of
180. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
181. Professor Anaya has suggested to me that a finding of preemption on the
ground that federal sanctions apply to a narrower range of conduct would not
necessarily reflect the application of a more lenient preemption standard. It might
reflect instead the belief that the inference that Congress intended to preempt
more stringent state laws is stronger with respect to sanctions against other coun-
tries than with respect to purely domestic matters. If the inference were indeed
stronger in the former case than in the latter, however, the reason would appear to
be that state intrusion into foreign affairs has long been held to be invalid in the
absence of congressional consent. To give effect to a presumption that the imposi-
tion of less stringent federal sanctions preempts more stringent state sanctions
thus seems tantamount to giving continuing effect to a doctrine of dormant for-
eign affairs preemption.
182. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000).
183. Id. at 375-76.
184. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriation
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996, § 370(a), 110 Stat. 3009-116 (1997) (specifying
factors President must consider in removing sanctions).
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sanctions that the President could impose.'3 5 It is difficult to describe the
effect of the Burma law as enhancing the President's discretion in dealing
with Burma. Even without the Burma law, the President had the power to
address the human rights problem in Burma pursuant to other, more gen-
eral laws. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), the President has the power to impose certain sanctions on
countries that pose a national emergency.1 8 , That IEEPA would have sup-
ported the imposition of some sanctions on Burma is shown by the fact
that the President relied on that statute in actually imposing the federal
Burma sanctions. 18 7 As construed by the courts, IEEPA appears to provide
ample authority for imposing the sanctions authorized by the Federal
Burma Law. '8 8
Just as Congress intended to give the President substantial flexibility
when it passed the Federal Burma Law, Congress intended to give the
President great flexibility to deal with international emergencies when it
enacted IEEPA. 18 9 IEEPA often has been employed to impose sanctions
on regimes that engage in serious human rights violations. jO Thus, if the
Massachusetts law was preempted because it conflicted with the Presi-
dent's flexibility to deal with the situation in Burma, then a similar law
imposing sanctions on, say, Nigeria, likely would have to be regarded as
preempted because it conflicts with the President's flexibility in dealing
with international emergencies generally.191
185. See id. (limiting range of sanctions).
186. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (1994) (permitting President to regulate or
prohibit "(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or pay-
ments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities"; and giving the
President great flexibility in dealing with "transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest").
187. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (May 20, 1997) ("By the
authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States, including ... the International Emergency Economic Powers Act .... ).
188. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1238, 1240-42 (1987).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 95-459, at 10 (1977) ("These new authorities should be
sufficiently broad and flexible."); Carter, supra note 188, at 1232.
190. See Exec. Order No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 7, 1999) (imposing
sanctions on Taliban regime in Afghanistan); Exec. Order No. 12,775, 56 Fed. Reg.
50,641, (Oct. 7, 1991), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,932, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,403 (Oct.
14, 1994) (imposing sanctions on Haiti); Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg.
65,729 (Nov. 15, 1979) (imposing sanctions on Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55
Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 3, 1990) (imposing sanctions on Iraq); see also Carter, supra
note 188, at 1239 ("It is unlikely that the courts will step in to limit resort to
IEEPA.").
191. Alameda County, Berkley and Oakland, California, and Amherst and
Cambridge, Massachusetts, have all passed sanctions legislation targeting Nigeria.
See Organization for International Investment, State and Municipal Sanctions Report,
at http://www.ofii.org/issues/sanction.cfm (last visited jan. 18, 2001) (cataloguing
local legislative efforts and sanctions).
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The President's flexibility was constrained by the Federal Burma Law
in at least one other important respect. In the absence of the latter law,
the President would have had the flexibility not to impose sanctions on
Burma. The Federal Burma Law required the President to impose sanc-
tions under certain circumstances, thus limiting his discretion to deter-
mine that Burma does not warrant the imposition of sanctions, or that the
imposition of sanctions would do more harm than good.' 9 2 Perhaps most
significantly, the Federal Burma Law limits presidential discretion by re-
quiring the President to focus his attention on Burma in preference to
other foreign relations matters he might consider more pressing.'1 3 If the
Massachusetts law posed an obstacle to congressionally conferred presi-
dential flexibility, then it would have been preempted by federal statutes
such as IEEPA even if Congress had not enacted a Federal Burma Law.
We may take the point a step further. The sort of relationship be-
tween state and federal law that the Court found sufficient to require the
invalidation of the Massachusetts Burma Law arguably would have been
present in the absence of any federal statute. The Constitution itself confers
on the President significant responsibilities in the area of foreign relations
that do not depend on a congressional grant.'9 4 The Constitution explic-
itly grants him the responsibility of conducting or negotiating treaties, 195
receiving ambassadors, 1 96 and the like. The courts have recognized even
greater presidential powers in this area.'9 7 They have gone so far as to
192. Federal Burma Law, § 570(a), 110 Stat. 3009-166 ("Until such time as the
President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has made measurable
and substantial progress in improving human fights practices and implementing
democratic government, the following sanctions shall be imposed .... .").
Although President Clinton did not object to the imposition of sanctions
against Burma, President Reagan did not regard the similar sanctions law enacted
with respect to South Africa as an enhancement of his flexibility. The Reagan
administration preferred to follow a policy of constructive engagement; Congress
enacted the sanctions law to force his hand. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 444-49 (1990). The Federal Burma Law similarly forces
the hand of a President who might prefer to follow a different policy.
193. See, e.g., § 570(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 ("The President shall seek to de-
velop .. . a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to ... improve human rights
practices .... ).
194. See generally HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 31-62.
195. The President has the power to make treaties, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, sect. 3, cl. 2. On the President's power to
negotiate treaties, see Swaine, supra note 8, at 59, which makes the case for a "dor-
mant treaty power," under which laws, such as the Massachusetts Burma Law, are
preempted because they interfere with the President's exclusive power to negotiate
treaties. See id. at 1274.
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This power is understood to encompass the re-
lated power to recognize foreign governments (or not to), which in turn has been
understood to encompass the power to enter into certain agreements with foreign
states without the Senate's consent. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See generally HENKIN (2d
ed.), supra note 7, at 37-38.
197. On the President's unenumerated foreign affairs power, see generally
HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 35-45.
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1293 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
describe the President as the "sole organ" of the nation with respect to
foreign affairs. 198 Under the Crosby Court's understanding of the sort of
relationship between state and federal law that can result in preemption,
we would apparently have to conclude that the Massachusetts law was pre-
empted by the Constitution's allocation of discretion to the President in the
area of foreign affairs. That, however, is precisely the rationale behind
dormant foreign affairs preemption (at least in part). Critics of that doc-
trine have argued that the best case for the doctrine rests on the view that
state foreign affairs activity frequently poses an obstacle to the President's
performance of the powers and duties conferred on him by the
Constitution. I 'J'
It is true that the scope of the President's exclusive powers in the area
of foreign affairs is disputed, and that the Court in Crosby was careful not
to take a position on the breadth of the President's exclusive powers in
this area.210 It emphasized that the President's power in this case was at its
zenith because he was acting pursuant to congressional delegation. 201
Thus, it might b.e objected that my suggestion that the Court implicitly
endorsed the dormant foreign affairs doctrine assumes a proposition that
the Court took care not to embrace. But I do not suggest that the Court
implicitly endorsed the dormant foreign affairs doctrine by accepting a
broad view of the President's exclusive power in this area. Critics of dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine do not deny that the Constitution gives the
President great discretion in the area of foreign affairs. Instead, they ar-
gue that it does notfollow that the Constitution frees the President from the
constraints imposed by otherwise valid state laws. 2 0 2 The Crosby Court ap-
pears to have concluded that a grant of significant power to the President
in the area of foreign affairs does implicitly free the President of such con-
straints. Recall that the Court in Crosby conceded that Congress had been
silent on the question of whether state laws that present an obstacle to
congressionally conferred flexibility were preempted. 2°13 The Court held
that the federal Burma law swept the obstacle away because it gave the
President great flexibility. 2° 4 My point is that the Court's logic in Crosby,
198. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(describing presidential powers).
199. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 391-401. Ramsey appears to regard the doc-
trine as one under which state laws are preempted insofar as they conflict with
substantive foreign policy decisions made by the President. For a critique of Ram-
sey's argument, see infra Part IV(B).
200. The Court did, however, cite Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
for the proposition that the President's constitutional power "is least restricted by
Congress" in the foreign relations area. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000).
201. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374.
202. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 8, at 392.
203. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
204. See id. at 387-88 (relying on congressional delegation of discretion to
strike down statute).
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inferring preemption from a grant of flexibility to the President, involved
the same sort of analytic leap that the critics of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine claim the defenders of that doctrine unjustifiably make. The
Court's mode of reasoning in Crosby leads to the conclusion that state laws
that pose a similar obstacle to constitutionally-conferred flexibility (a flexi-
bility that is indeed broader in some respects than that conferred by the
Federal Burma Law) are similarly swept away by the Constitution. If so,
then the Court in Crosby implicitly endorsed the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine.
As noted in Part II, the Court cited no direct evidence that Congress
meant to preempt state sanctions; it noted that Congress was "silent" on
that question.2 0 5 That Congress gave the President certain powers-even
if many and broad-does not mean that it intended to give him other
powers (such as the power to disregard state sanctions), much less that it
intended to sweep away state sanctions itself. As the Court has recognized
in other contexts, the enumeration of certain powers is generally thought
to presuppose something not enumerated.20 6 The conclusion that laws
(whether constitutional or statutory) granting the President great flexibil-
ity to achieve certain ends, without more, preempt state laws that might
get in the way of such ends is thus unwarranted. Ascription of intent to
preempt state laws requires more direct evidence of a conflict between the
state and federal laws.
The closest the Court came in Crosby to identifying an actual conflict
between the Massachusetts Burma Law and the Federal Burma Law had
less to do with the great flexibility the federal law conferred on the Presi-
dent than with the power it gave the President to escape the shackles the
federal law placed on him. After noting that the federal law required the
President to impose sanctions under certain circumstances and gave him
the discretion to impose limited sanctions in additional cases, the Court
noted that the federal law gave the President the power "'to waive, tempo-
rarily or permanently, any sanction [under the federal act] ... if he deter-
mines and certifies to Congress that the application of such sanction
would be contrary to the national security interests of the United
States."' 20 7 The Court seemed to think the Massachusetts Burma Law was
in particular conflict with this aspect of the Federal Burma Law. The
Court stressed that the Massachusetts sanctions are "immediate . . .and
perpetual, there being no termination provision ....,208 "This unyielding
application undermines the President's intended statutory authority by
making it impossible for him to restrain fully the coercive power of the
national economy . *..."209 The Court regarded it as "unlikely that Con-
205. See id. at 388.
206. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
207. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369-70 (citing § 570(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-167).
208. Id. at 376-77.
209. Id.
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gress intended both to enable the President to protect national security by
giving him the flexibility to suspend or terminate federal sanctions and
simultaneously to allow Massachusetts to act at odds with the President's
judgment of what national security requires." 210
It would indeed be odd if the President had the power to waive the
federal sanctions but not the state sanctions. It is also true that the Fed-
eral Burma Law gives the President in express terms the power to waive
only the federal sanctions.2 1' But it is not clear that the President would
lack the authority to waive state sanctions independently of the Federal
Burma Law. For example, the President would appear to have the author-
ity to displace state and local sanctions pursuant to an agreement entered
into with Burma in connection with a resumption of full diplomatic rela-
tions.2 12 Even if the President lacked the power to waive state sanctions
apart from the Federal Burma Law, however, a more narrowly tailored
response to this problem would have been to interpret the Federal Burma
Law to confer this authority implicitly. It is true that the federal statute
was silent with respect to this presidential authority. But it was equally
silent with respect to the preemption question. If the lack of a presiden-
tial power to waive state sanctions was the problem, then holding the state
statute preempted immediately and in its entirety was an overbroad
remedy.
To put the matter differently: if preemption was warranted by this
conflict, the only aspect of the state law that should have been "displaced"
was the absence of a provision giving the President the power to waive the
state sanctions. If the lack of a presidential power to waive the state sanc-
tions was the problem, then the problem would be cured if the state
amended the statute to give the President the power to waive the sanc-
tions. 213 Presumably, the state would prefer to give the President that
power than to have the statute preempted immediately and in its entirety.
The problem with the state statute was thus the absence of a provision
authorizing the President to waive the sanctions. If this conflict warranted
210. Id. at 376 n.10.
211. See Federal Burma Law, § 570(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-167 (establishing
presidential waiver authority).
212. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1941); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
213. This part of the Court's opinion suggests that a state law imposing more
stringent sanctions on Burma would not be invalid if the state law explicitly gave
the President the power to waive the state sanctions. See Robert Stumberg, Preemp-
tion and Human Rights: Local Options after Crosby v. NFTC, 32 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 109, 145 (2000). To be sure, it seems strange to say that a state can give the
President power to displace state law in the foreign affairs area, and in fact I do not
think that the state statute would be upheld if it did provide the President such
powers. But, if I am right, then the Court's preemption holding does not really
rest on this point. The anomaly produced by the fact that Congress gave the Presi-
dent the power to waive federal but not state sanctions probably resulted from
Congress' assumption that state sanctions were invalid under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine.
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preemption, then the only aspect of the statute that should have been
deemed preempted was its omission of a presidential waiver power. A fed-
eral statute would "preempt" a state statute's omission of a power by pro-
viding the power itself.
It is true that the President might prefer not to have to bother with
the monitoring of state statutes, and he might also prefer not to have to
take the political heat for preempting state human rights sanctions, but
that takes us back to the question of what entitles the President to be free
of such burdens. There is nothing in the grant of presidential flexibility to
indicate that Congress intended the flexibility to extend so far. To con-
clude that the Constitution frees him of such burdens is to accept a dor-
mant foreign affairs power. Similarly, Congress might have neglected to
include a power to waive state sanctions because it assumed such sanctions
were invalid under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But this would
be a reason to strike the statute down on dormant foreign affairs grounds,
not preemption.
2 14
3. Congress' Desire for a Multilateral Solution
The Court's third reason for holding the Massachusetts Burma Law
preempted was that it was "at odds with the President's intended authority
to speak for the United States among the world's nations in developing a
'comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve
human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma.' '2 15 If the Court
meant that Congress had instructed the President to pursue a multilateral
strategy, then this aspect of the Federal Burma Law represents a further
limit on the President's discretion. If Congress merely empowered the Presi-
dent to pursue such a strategy, then this aspect of the law seems superflu-
ous, as the President clearly has the power to pursue multilateral strategies
to address such situations under IEEPA and directly under the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, the presidential power to negotiate treaties is the power to
address international problems in a multilateral fashion.2 16 If anything, it
214. This is yet another example of how Congress may have relied on the
existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine when it enacted the Federal
Burma Law, and thus it is another reason to adhere to that doctrine on stare deci-
sis grounds.
215. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380 (quoting § 570(c), 110 Stat. at 30009-166).
216. The Federal Burma Law's reference to a "multilateral" response to the
Burma problem might not be superfluous if it were construed as advance authori-
zation of international agreements on Burma, eliminating the need for subsequent
approval of such agreements by the Congress or the Senate. But arguably the Pres-
ident already had the power to make such agreements without subsequent ap-
proval. See supra notes 196, 212 and accompanying text. In any event, as discussed
above, the grant of this power does not warrant an inference that the federal stat-
ute itself preempted state laws. The discussion in the preceding subsection applies
fully here. At most, the grant of such power warrants an inference that the federal
statute implicitly grants the President the power to preempt state laws through
international agreements (something he may in fact have had the power to do in
the absence of the statute).
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is the President's power to act unilaterally that stands on weaker ground.
Even if the statute enhanced the President's ability to achieve a multilat-
eral solution to the Burma problem, such enhancement does not warrant
an inference that the statute preempts state law of its own force. The
points made above with respect to Congress' grant of flexibility to the Pres-
ident apply equally to the Court's reliance on Congress' preference for a
multilateral solution. That Congress preferred a multilateral solution
does not mean that it was willing to pay any cost to achieve such a
solution. 2 17
This third factor was nevertheless important to the Court's analysis
because it provided the vehicle for consideration of the protests that had
been raised by third countries to the Massachusetts Burma Law.2 18 The
Court's reliance on these protests was a particularly interesting feature of
its opinion because those complaints related to an alleged violation of the
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP). 2 19 If the Massachusetts
Burma Law conflicted with any federal law, it conflicted most sharply with
the AGP.22 0 The Court did not invalidate the Massachusetts law on this
ground, however, because Congress, in implementing this agreement, had
specified that any challenges to state laws as violations of WTO agreements
could be entertained in U.S. courts only at the behest of the federal gov-
ernment.22 1 Massachusetts argued in Crosby that, given the foreign states'
lack of standing to challenge state laws as violating the AGP, those states'
217. I am reminded here of a comment by Professor Andrew Koppelman
about the Supreme Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In refus-
ing to remand the case to the Florida courts for further recounts, the U.S. Su-
preme Court relied on the Florida statute establishing a December 12 cut-off date,
as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111. Professor
Koppelman criticized the Court's reasoning, noting that "the Florida court did not
even say that meeting the date was of overriding importance, only that it was a goal
favored by the legislature. To infer that the goal overrides all else is to collapse the
distinction between a want and an overriding want. It is to say that, when I tell you
I'd like a glass of water, I am thereby implying that I would kill my children to get
it." Posting of Andrew Koppelman, akoppelman@nwu.edu, to conlaw-
prof@listserv.ucla.edu (Dec. 13, 2000) (copy on file with author). The Supreme
Court appears to have committed the same sort of analytical error in Crosby.
218. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382-83 (discussing protests by U.S. trading
partners).
219. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex 4(b), LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/gpr-94.pdf(1994); see Crosby, 530
U.S. at 383 (explaining that complaints by European Union and Japan were based
on "certain provisions of the [AGP]") (citing H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1719
(1994)).
220. On the compatibility of state selective purchasing laws with the AGP, see
generally Christopher McCrudden, A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of 'Selec-
tive Purchasing' Laws Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 3 (1999). Note, however, that if my analysis in Part III (A) is correct, the
ACP may be unconstitutional.
221. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512(b)(2)(A),
3512(c)(1) (1994).
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unadjudicated claims that the law violated the AGP should not be relied
upon in holding the statute preempted.
22 2
The Court dismissed this argument in a footnote on the dubious
ground that this was not a case seeking to challenge the state law on the
basis of the AGP, but rather a challenge to the state law on the basis of the
Federal Burma Law.2 2 3 The Court overlooked the ways in which the AGP
might be relevant to the preemption issue. The AGP, after all, was a fed-
eral law that directly addressed the validity of state procurement laws, and
did so in a way that apparently prohibited laws such as Massachusetts'. Yet
Congress had provided that any state laws claimed to be invalid on this
ground could be nullified only through judicial action initiated by the Ex-
ecutive branch. Is it likely that, when Congress later passed a law prohibit-
ing private parties from doing business with Burma in certain
circumstances, it meant to nullify state laws already prohibited by the
AGP? If so, is it likely that Congress intended to permit private parties to
challenge such laws in court? And, given that Congress burdened the Ex-
ecutive branch with the responsibility to monitor state procurement laws
to ensure compliance with the AGP, is it likely that Congress intended to
free the Executive branch from the obstacles such laws might pose to its
efforts to promote democracy in Burma?
224
Whatever the answers to the foregoing questions, the Court's willing-
ness to take foreign protests concerning the AGP into account in preemp-
tion analysis produces an ironic result. Congress obviously denied private
parties and foreign countries standing to challenge state laws as violating
the AGP in order to protect the states.225 In light of the Court's decision
in Crosby, however, the states may be worse off because of this provision.
222. See Brief for Petitioners at 45-46, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99474) (arguing that foreign complaints should be
ignored).
223. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 386 n.24 (rejecting state's argument).
224. Cf Delahunty, supra note 8, at 45 ("Congress' policy of sheltering state
procurement laws from preemption challenges establishes that reviewing courts
should be averse to finding that Congress, in other legislation, has affirmatively
preempted them."). To the extent Delahunty argues further that Congress affirm-
atively authorized state procurement laws that violate the AGP (at least in the ab-
sence of preemptive action by the President), he goes too far. See id. at 42
("Congress [has] in fact authorized such state action here."). But cf id. at 43 (stat-
ing that AGP, as implemented, "notionally" preempts conflicting state law). The
fact that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act denies private parties standing to
obtain relief against states that violate the AGP does not mean that the Act relieves
the states of having to comply with the AGP. The President does not control the
preemptive effect of the AGP. State statutes that conflict with the AGP are in the-
ory preempted by the AGP, whether or not the President brings suit, and when the
President does bring suit, the courts will declare them preempted by the AGP, not
by the President. Indeed, the courts may well disagree with the President and hold
that state law is not preempted. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (2) (B) (ii) (1994) ("[T]he
United States shall have the burden of proving that the law that is the subject of
the action ... is inconsistent with the agreement in question.").
225. See Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 45, 69 (1998).
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Without this provision, the Court in Crosby presumably could have deter-
mined whether the Massachusetts Burma Law was consistent with the AGP.
Conceivably, it might have concluded that the Massachusetts law did not
violate that agreement. 226 (Even if the Massachusetts law would not have
been found valid, other state laws might well be.) Had the state law been
found compatible with the AGP, presumably foreign protests would de-
serve no weight. Because of the provision denying standing to private par-
ties and foreign states, however, the court lacks the authority to address
the merits of that controversy. 227 Yet, under Crosby, a state law can be held
preempted on the basis of untested and potentially unmeritorious claims
of conflict with the AGP.
The Court's reliance on these foreign protests is noteworthy as well in
that it reflects the Court's continuing exceptionalism in the foreign affairs
area. The Court in Crosby distinguished Barclays Bank, in which it had pre-
viously rejected reliance on foreign protests in determining whether a
state law is invalid under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause:
[In Barclays Bank,] [w]e found the reactions of foreign powers...
irrelevant in fathoming congressional intent because Congress
had taken specific actions rejecting the positions . . . of foreign
governments .... Here, however, Congress has done nothing to
render such evidence beside the point.228
In other words, if Congress has specifically rejected the position of the
foreign government protesters, then such protests are irrelevant, but in
the face of congressional silence, those protests should be given weight in
the preemption analysis. If the complaints of foreign countries are a basis
for finding state laws to be preempted in the face of congressional silence,
then the resulting doctrine closely approximates the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. That doctrine, after all, stands for the proposition that cer-
tain state laws are so likely to be found offensive to foreign states that they
should be invalidated lest the insult to the foreign state adversely affect the
nation's ability to maintain harmonious foreign relations. In any case in-
volving such a statute, it would not be surprising to find foreign state ob-
jections to the relevant state law. To permit preemption decisions to be
influenced by such complaints would be to retain a degree of foreign af-
fairs exceptionalism, as one is unlikely to find foreign state complaints in a
purely domestic preemption case (almost by definition).
226. See McCrudden, supra note 220, at 3.
227. Thus, the Court made clear in Crosby that it was expressing no opinion
on the merits of the foreign states' claims. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (declining
comment on merits of claim).
228. Id.
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4. Summary
The Court's willingness to find that the state law was preempted in
Crosby in the absence of compelling evidence of a conflict with the provi-
sions of the federal law is in sharp contrast with its reluctance to find pre-
emption in similar domestic cases. 229 The Court's lax approach to
229. SeeYoung, supra note 99, at 172-73; Denning & McCall, supra note 16, at
755. See generally Rotunda, supra note 99(noting trend away from preemption).
Since Professor Rotunda wrote, commentators have detected a retreat from this
reluctance to find preemption. They cite in particular another preemption deci-
sion of the 1999 Term, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See,
e.g., Michael Gottesman, The New Federalism and the New Preemption: Diverging Paths
(forthcoming 2002). But, although the Court did rely on obstacle preemption in
that case, its preemption holding was supported by far more direct evidence than
in Crosby of a conflict between federal and state law. The Court in Ceierfound that
a federal regulation providing for a gradual phase-in of a requirement that cars be
equipped with airbags preempted a state tort law imposing an immediate require-
ment that cars be so equipped. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 882. The agency had opted
for a phase-in period in order to encourage experimentation by automobile manu-
facturers with respect to safety mechanisms. Id. at 901. By requiring that all cars
be equipped with one such mechanism immediately, the state law directly frus-
trated the purpose of the federal regulation. There was accordingly "clear evi-
dence of a conflict" between state and federal law. Id. at 885. The dissenters
disputed both the majority's assessment of the agency's purpose in opting for a
gradual phase-in, see id. at 903-04, and its description of the nature of the state law,
see id. at 903 n.18. My point here, though, is that if the regulation was designed as
it was for the purpose of encouraging experimentation by manufacturers, then it
was reasonable to read the regulation as imposing both a floor and a ceiling; and if
the state law imposed a duty to adopt a single approach, then it imposed a floor
that was higher than the federal ceiling. In light of the majority's conclusions
about the purpose of the regulation and the nature of the state law, therefore, the
conflict was clear and palpable. By contrast, a general purpose on Congress' part
to give the President a high degree of flexibility in achieving democracy in Burma
tells us nothing about the more specific question whether Congress intended to
give the President the flexibility to preempt state laws that imposed sanctions on
conduct not prohibited by the federal statute. Neither does it tell us that Congress
intended to sweep away those state laws itself.
Critics and defenders of the Geier decision alike have said that the Court ap-
plied a looser approach to preemption than in prior cases. See The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 339, 349 (2000) (approving of decision); Gottes-
man, supra (disapproving of decision). Defenders of the decision have argued that
this approach was justified because of the need for uniform rules to govern tort
actions relating to products that move easily in interstate commerce. See Leading
Cases, supra, at 348-49. If the Geier approach to obstacle preemption applies solely
in this context, then its unusually receptive approach to preemption may be justi-
fied for reasons very similar to those offered here to explain the result in Crosby. In
both cases, the receptive approach to preemption may be explained because of the
uniquely federal interests involved, which in both cases is reflected in the judicial
recognition of a closely related dormant federal legislative power (the dormant
Commerce Clause in Geier and the dormant foreign affairs power in Crosby). On
the other hand, if Geier represents a broad shift towards a looser preemption stan-
dard in the domestic sphere, then Crosby may be less "exceptionalist" than I have
indicated in the text. In that event, the Court's approach to preemption in both
the domestic and foreign spheres would be vulnerable to the criticisms articulated
in this section. Cf Nelson, supra note 55, at 225 (criticizing obstacle preemption
on similar grounds). In any event, even the receptive approach to preemption
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obstacle preemption in Crosby was not entirely unprecedented, however.
The Court took a similar approach in Hines v. Davidowitz,2 30 the decision
to which the Court itself traced the concept of obstacle preemption in
Crosby.231 Crosby and Hines illustrate how closely the Court's willingness to
infer preemption corresponds to the extent to which the case implicates
foreign affairs. The bulk of the Court's opinion in Hines was devoted to
the proposition that the responsibility for conducting foreign affairs is al-
located by the Constitution to the federal government, and that states ac-
cordingly have little if any role to play in this sphere. 232 In concluding
that a state law regulating immigration was preempted by the federal regu-
latory scheme in immigration, despite the lack of any direct conflict be-
tween the federal and state laws, the Court relied significantly on these
background principles. 2 33 Indeed, the Court's willingness in Hines to find
state laws preempted in the face of congressional silence on the preemp-
tion issue and in the absence of any palpable conflict between state and
federal law has led some commentators to treat Hines as a dormant foreign
affairs power case.23 4 The Court's heavy reliance on Hines in Crosby is
hardly indicative of any desire to decide the case on the basis of the "set-
tled . . . implied preemption doctrine" that the Court applies in purely
domestic cases.
The relationship between Crosby and the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine is illuminated by the Court's decision in Boyle v. United Technologies
Cop.235 As noted above, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine shares im-
portant attributes of federal common law. In discussing the relationship
between preemption and federal common law in Boyle, the Court stressed
that there is no sharp line between the two concepts. 23 6 Both doctrines
result in the displacement of state law because of a conflict with federal
law. In the case of federal common law, "[t]he conflict with federal policy
need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption
when Congress legislates 'in a field which the States have traditionally oc-
evident in Geier does not appear to be nearly as receptive as the approach em-
ployed in Crosby. If the Court's recent preemption decisions in the domestic con-
text are problematic, the Crosby decision is even more problematic.
It is noteworthy, in any event, that Geier was a 5-4 decision, with a stinging
dissent decrying the "freewheeling" and "potentially boundless" nature of the ma-
jority's application of obstacle preemption, see 529 U.S. at 906, 907, while the even-
more-freewheeling approach to obstacle preemption in Crosby did not generate a
single dissent. The point ofJustice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas, was to stress that the case for upholding the Massachusetts Burma Law
was even more obvious than the majority believed.
230. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
231. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
232. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-65 (emphasizing federal supremacy in foreign
affairs).
233. See id. at 74 (finding state law cannot be enforced).
234. See, e.g., Denning & McCall, supra note 96, at 319-20.
235. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
236. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
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cupied.' Or, to put the point differently, the fact that the area in question
is one of uniquely federal concern changes what would otherwise be a
conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can."2:17 The
Court here dropped a footnote explaining that "the distinctive federal in-
terest in a particular field [has long been] used as a significant factor giv-
ing broad preemptive effect to federal legislation in that field." 238 There
followed a lengthy quotation from Hines about the uniquely federal inter-
est in foreign affairs and the relevance of this fact for preemption
doctrine. 239
Boyle thus shows that there is no single approach to preemption; the
applicable approach depends on the subject matter involved. 240 Where
the federal government has regulated in any area traditionally regulated
by the states, then one approach to preemption applies, under which pre-
emption can occur only in the event of a severe conflict. But where the
states have legislated in an area of uniquely federal interest, state law can
be preempted even though the conflict with federal law is far less discern-
able. Hines and Boyle affirm that foreign affairs is an area of uniquely fed-
eral interest demanding exceptional treatment when it comes to the
preemption of state law, and Crosby establishes that it remains an area of
uniquely federal interest justifying preemption even in the face of ambigu-
ous congressional silence. 2 4 1
Finally, Boyle establishes that preemption doctrine builds in not only
exceptionalism, but also dormancy. At the far end of the preemption
spectrum recognized in Boyle stood what is generally regarded as federal
common law, under which state law is displaced by "federal rules of deci-
sion whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of interpreta-
tion to federal statutory or constitutional commands." 242 Just as state law
addressing the defenses of federal contractors was displaced in Boyle in the
absence of any statute reflecting a congressional intent to displace such
237. Id. at 508.
238. Id. at 508 n.4.
239. See id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-71 (1941)).
240. It does not depend solely on this factor, but this is one important factor.
See generally Dinh, supra note 52, at 2103-07.
241. My argument here echoes Ernest Young's observation that Crosby reflects
a milder version of the same sort of exceptionalism evident in dormant foreign
affairs cases. See Young, supra note 99, at 140-141. Jack Goldsmith responds to
Young by observing that the Court in Crosby was faced with a conflict between the
presumption against preemption and the "Hines canon favoring preemption for
foreign relations statutes," and "declined to rely on either." Goldsmith, New For-
malism, supra note 11, at 216 n.159. Goldsmith thus recognizes that foreign affairs
exceptionalism was built into pre-Crosby preemption doctrine. Although it is true
that the Court in Crosby did not identify a special preemption canon for foreign
relations cases, it did invoke Hines at several points. See 530 U.S. at 372-74, 377-78,
380, 388. On the significance of the Court's refusal to acknowledge that it was
applying a more lenient preemption standard, see infra text accompanying note
244.
242. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 51, at 756.
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law, the Massachusetts Burma Law was found preempted in Crosby in the
absence of any federal statute reflecting a congressional intent to displace
laws of that type. The only question after Crosby concerns the scope of
Crosby's dormant preemption rule: In the face of congressional silence on
the preemption question, are state laws imposing sanctions on a given
country preempted only when Congress enacts a statute imposing parallel
but narrower sanctions on the same country, or are they also preempted
by federal statutes or constitutional provisions giving the President broad
power to address foreign emergencies and conduct the nation's foreign
relations, or more broadly by the constitutional provisions that give the
federal government, and not the states, the responsibility for the conduct
of foreign affairs?
IV. W(H)ITHER ZSCHERNIG?
In Part 1I, I considered whether the Zschernig doctrine has in fact
withered away, as some critics maintain. 243 I concluded that Crosby is virtu-
ally a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise. While I have been very
critical of the decision, my criticism has been directed not so much to the
Court's implicit reaffirmation of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, but
to its attempt to disguise that affirmation. Jack Goldsmith may be correct
when he notes that, if the Court in Crosby did attempt to disguise its exer-
cise of foreign affairs exceptionalism, this effort would itself be significant
because it would suggest that "the Court believes that the judicial foreign
relations effects test is sufficiently illegitimate that it requires masking."244
For obvious reasons, however, judicial deception of this kind is unaccept-
able. The Court will eventually have to decide whether to reject, embrace,
or refine the Zschernig doctrine. In this Part, I consider whether the
Zschernig doctrine deserves to wither.
The critics of the Zschernig doctrine have raised some valid concerns.
I generally share their aversion to foreign affairs exceptionalism. 24 5 The
concerns they raise, however, do not justify the doctrine's abandonment.
Like some of the revisionists' other proposals, their call for a repudiation
of dormant foreign affairs doctrine would throw the baby out with the
bathwater.24 6
243. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 8, at 54 ("As precedent, Zschernig is either
irrelevant or dead.").
244. Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra 11, at 221. Goldsmith notes, however,
that he thinks "there is no basis in the [Crosby] opinion" for thinking that the
Court was engaged in an exercise of foreign affairs exceptionalism. Id.
245. Indeed, I have been critical of revisionist approaches to the doctrine of
"non-self-executing" treaties that seek to draw a sharp distinction between the Con-
stitution's mechanisms for enforcing treaties and its mechanisms for enforcing
other forms of federal law. See Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2198 n.178 (1999).
246. I have a similar reaction to the revisionists' call for a repudiation of the
enforcement of customary international law as federal common law because some
commentators and international organizations have made exaggerated claims
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The critiques of Zschernig fall into three broad categories. The first
consists of textual or originalist critiques. The thrust of these critiques is
that the Framers' express inclusion of specific disabilities of the states in
the foreign affairs area makes it highly unlikely that they intended to pro-
hibit the states more broadly from interfering with the federal govern-
ment's unexercised power to conduct the nation's foreign relations. The
second category consists of what I shall call structural or policy arguments.
Several distinct arguments fall in this category. The first admits that ex-
cluding the states from interfering with foreign relations made sense at an
earlier point in our history, but argues that the exclusion is no longer
necessary because foreign states now have the ability to retaliate against
individual states of the Union, and, in any event, the stakes of such inter-
ference are much lower now that the Cold War is over. The second seeks
to rebut the claim that state foreign affairs activity serves no useful purpose
by arguing that permitting the states to conduct foreign relations unless
preempted by statute protects Congress' prerogatives in the foreign affairs
area from usurpation by the President. The final category consists of what
I shall call functional critiques. These include critiques based on the diffi-
culty of distinguishing foreign from domestic affairs in this age of global-
ization, and the impropriety of assigning foreign policy judgments to
judges unsuited to the task.
I shall consider these critiques in turn. I conclude that the textual/
originalist critiques are of limited significance with respect to an estab-
lished subconstitutional doctrine such as this one; I reject the critiques
based on structure or policy; and I conclude that the functionalist criti-
ques warrant at best a reformulation of the doctrine, but not its
abandonment.
A. Textual and Originalist Critiques
The textual argument against the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
simple but compelling: The Constitution includes a number of provisions
that expressly prohibit the states from engaging in certain activities relat-
ing to foreign affairs. These are found in Article I, section 10, which pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation (or] grant Letters of Marque or Reprisal," 247 or, "without
the consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or ships of
War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power or engage in War, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." 2 48 The inclusion
about what the customary international law of human rights requires. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 816, 818 (1997) [here-
inafter, Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law]. I would urge instead
that the exaggerated claims be rejected.
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
2001] 1305
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of these express disabilities in the constitutional text suggests that the
Framers did not intend to require congressional permission for other state
activities that might touch on foreign affairs. 249
Similar textual problems bedevil the Constitution's affirmative grants
of power to the federal government, however.2 50 Such textual embarrass-
ments led Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court in United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., to conclude that the powers of the federal
government in the foreign affairs area were not conferred by the Constitu-
tion, but instead passed to the national government with indepen-
dence. 251 Justice Sutherland's history has been disputed,252 but his
conclusion that the federal government possesses an unenumerated for-
eign affairs power nevertheless prevails today.2 5 3
Textual scruples regarding an unenumerated general exclusion of
states from foreign affairs have led some commentators to defend an ex-
clusion of the states from activity more directly tied to specific grants of
power. Edward Swaine, for example, has defended what he calls the dor-
mant treaty power, under which states are excluded from negotiating trea-
ties with foreign nations either explicitly or implicitly.254 The dormant
federal power that he defends is expansive enough to condemn the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law.255 This reformulation and slight narrowing of
Zschernig relieves the textual problem only slightly, however. Rather than
reading a dormant feature into an unenumerated power, he would read
one into an enumerated power. That the Constitution does not in terms
prohibit state negotiations of treaties remains a problem. Indeed, as Pro-
fessor Henkin notes, because the Constitution permits agreements be-
tween states and foreign states with the consent of Congress, it implies that
states have the power to negotiate such agreements, for otherwise they
would have no agreements to present to Congress for its consent. 25 6
Scholars have also debated whether there is evidence apart from the
constitutional text that the Founding generation, or succeeding ones, con-
templated a dormant foreign affairs power. Zschernig's defenders empha-
249. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 371; Thomas Barnico, The Road from Burma:
State Boycotts After Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 89,
106-07 (2001); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 246, at
862-63.
250. See generally HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 35-45, 64-69.
251. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
252. See HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 19-20; Charles Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J.
1, 1 (1973); David Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Justice Suther-
land's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 475 (1946).
253. See HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 20. But see Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001)
(defending text-based theory of Executive's foreign affairs power).
254. See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1254-55, 1261-64.
255. See id. at 1273.
256. See HENKIN (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 156.
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size the Founders' intent to design a government that would not be
subject to the problems that states had created for the Confederation
through their parochial foreign affairs activities during the critical pe-
riod.257 They cite general statements showing that the Founders intended
to entrust the foreign affairs power to the federal government and not the
states, such as Madison's oft-quoted statement that "if we are to be one
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."
2 58
Zscherni's critics respond that the Founders addressed the problem that
existed under the Articles of Confederation by specifically excluding states
from certain activities relating to foreign affairs and by giving the federal
government the power to preempt state law through the enactment of
statutes. 25 9 They note that the general statements on which the doctrine's
defenders rely sought to explain the affirmative grants of power to the
federal government, not to affirm the existence of a self-executing exclu-
sion beyond those expressed in Article I, § 10.26o) The critics have cited
incidents subsequent to the Founding that seem inconsistent with a dor-
mant foreign affairs power,26 1 while the defenders'have countered with
incidents supporting the doctrine, 262 and by reminding us that "few
norms ... are perfectly enforced.
'2 63
The textual and historical debate is interesting but not ultimately de-
terminative. Even the most diehard of originalists concede that, in consti-
tutional interpretation, the original intent must often give way to stare
decisis concerns. 264 And, as noted above, the Justices agree that stare de-
cisis plays an even stronger role in nonconstitutional cases.265 For the rea-
sons discussed above, the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption,
like the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, should be treated as subcon-
stitutional for this purpose. It is true that the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine lacks the long pedigree of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.2 66 Zschernig is so far the only case to hold a state law preempted
solely on this ground.26 7 But Zschernig did not spring full-grown from the
257. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, States'Rights and Foreign
Policy: Some Things Should Be Left To Washington, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 12-13 (2000).
258. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Denning &
McCall, supra note 257, at 12.
259. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 8, at 368.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 8, at 1228-41.
263. See id. at 1241.
264. See supra note 81.
265. See supra notes 57, 82; see also Toff E. Freed, Is Stare Decisis Still the Light-
house Beacon of Supreme Court Jurisprudence?, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767, 1776 (1996)
("Stare decisis concerns are at their zenith in decisions involving property and
contract fights regulated by statutes.").
266. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 304 (1851) (laying foun-
dation for dormant Commerce Clause).
267. See Carol E. Head, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional Impli-
cations for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries, 42 B.C. L.
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head ofJustice Douglas. The decision was close to unanimous, and two of
the Justices would have gone further than Justice Douglas.2 68 Indeed, as
one critic of dormant foreign affairs doctrine notes, Zschernig"rel[ied] on
a matter of common sense supported by almost a century of decisions re-
peating that common sense as dicta. ' '269
Stare decisis promotes stability and predictability in the law. The pos-
sibility that Congress may have relied on the existence of a judicial prece-
dent in enacting laws in related areas is usually considered a strong reason
to adhere to even an erroneous constitutional decision. Although it is dif-
ficult to measure precisely the extent to which Congress has relied on a
decision, the discussion in Parts II and III suggested a variety of ways in
which Congress may have relied on the existence of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. Indeed, much of what the Court in Crosby took as evi-
dence of an implicit intent to preempt state laws such as Massachusetts' is
more likely evidence that Congress assumed the invalidity of the Massa-
chusetts law on dormant foreign affairs grounds. The claim that the origi-
nal decision was insufficiently supported by constitutional text or evidence
of the Framers' intent, or was erroneous when rendered for other reasons,
is thus insufficient to justify its repudiation. Stare decisis principles de-
mand that the repudiation of this doctrine be supported by strong reasons
of a structural or functional sort.
B. Critiques Based on Structure and Policy
The critiques based on constitutional structure and policy take a vari-
ety of forms. They typically begin by conceding the force of the structural
argument in favor of dormant foreign affairs preemption. 2 70 Some critics
then proceed to argue that the structural premises that once justified the
doctrine no longer hold, and that state foreign affairs activity is in any
event tolerable today because the stakes have fallen significantly with the
waning of the Cold War.27 1 Others maintain that a constitutional doctrine
that lacks support in positive originalist sources should be adopted only if
its absence would be irrational, and they argue that a no-dormant-foreign-
REV. 123, 138 (2000) ("The Supreme Court has only once struck down a state law
for impermissibly interfering with the federal government's dormant power over
foreign affairs.").
268. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441-443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring, joined by Brennan, J.).
269. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 357; see also Spiro, supra note 8, at 1246 (re-
viewing Zschernigs doctrinal pedigree). See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 63 (1941) (giving underpinnings of doctrine); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275, 279-80 (1875) (supporting development of doctrine); Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 8, at 1641-64 (reviewing history and reasoning behind federal
common law of foreign relations); PeterJ. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an
Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 121, 135-45 (1994).
270. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1246-59; Ramsey, supra note 8, at 365-73.
271. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1259-70.
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affairs-preemption regime serves a rational purpose. 2 72 Others argue sim-
ply that dormant foreign affairs preemption is bad because it makes it
more difficult to exert pressure on foreign regimes that violate human
rights. Before responding to these arguments, I briefly outline the affirm-
ative structural case for dormant foreign affairs preemption.
The structural case for dormant foreign affairs preemption is well en-
capsulated in Hamilton's dictum that "the peace of the WHOLE ought not
to be left at the disposal of a PART."273 Under international law, the na-
tion is responsible for violations of international law by any of its parts.
For this and related reasons, any conduct by states that offends foreign
nations is likely to result in retaliation against the nation as a whole.
274
The decision whether to take action that is likely to offend foreign states
would, if left to the states, be "consistently distorted [by] significant exter-
nalities." 275 While the benefits of such action would accrue to the state,
the costs of the action-meaning the risk of retaliation-would be spread
among the fifty states. "[S] tate-level actors, because they do not shoulder
the consequences of their actions, will not take into account those conse-
quences in the decision-making balance."27 6 Only the national govern-
ment is structured in such a way as to gauge accurately the costs and
benefits to the nation of action likely to offend foreign nations.
277
272. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 379.
273. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
274. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1297-98 (1996).
275. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1247.
276. Id. Spiro adds: "These externalities will also tend to create information
deficiencies; because the states will not shoulder the consequences of their con-
duct, they have less incentive to understand what those consequences will be. In-
deed, a standard lament of state-level foreign policy activity is that it is based on
insufficient expertise." Id.
277. For a vivid reminder of the imbalance to which Spiro refers, consider
Governor James Gilmore's decision to execute Angel Breard in defiance of an or-
der of the International Court ofJustice and in the face of the Secretary of State's
communication to him that compliance with the order was important to the safety
of U.S. citizens traveling abroad. Gilmore explained that, "as Governor of Virginia
my first duty is to ensure that those who reside within [Virginia's] borders... may
conduct their lives free from the fear of crime." Commonwealth of Virginia, Of-
fice of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concern-
ing the Execution of Angel Breard at 2 (Apr. 14, 1998). Presumably, this interest
of the citizens of Virginia outweighed, in the Governor's calculation, the interest of
U.S. citizens traveling abroad, most of whom are presumably not citizens of Vir-
ginia. For a discussion of this incident, see generally Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,
Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Mea-
sures, 92 Am.J. INT'L L. 683, 683-84 (1998) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Breard and Federal
Power]. Professor Kirgis has suggested that the Breard execution may have violated
the Zschernig doctrine. See Kirgis, supra note 7, at 707. I have made the more lim-
ited argument that, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the political
branches of the federal government had the power to require Virginia to comply
with the ICJ's order. See Vzquez, Breard and Federal Power, supra, at 683.
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Of course, dormant foreign affairs preemption is not the only way to
address this problem. The Framers plainly regarded this as one of the
most severe problems with the regime of the Articles of Confederation,
and the principal way they addressed it in the Constitution was by giving
the federal government the power to make treaties and to legislate in the
foreign relations area, by making the resulting treaties and statutes the
supreme law of the land, and by expressly prohibiting certain activities by
the states. The critics of dormant foreign affairs preemption argue that
these steps are enough to protect us against the feared negative
externalities. 2 78
A structural defense of the Zschernig doctrine thus requires an expla-
nation of why we cannot depend on the political branches to monitor state
activity that might be offensive to foreign nations and to enact legislation
to preempt such activity. The best argument relies on the key insight of
the federalist critics of federal common law: The federal legislative process
was deliberately made onerous in order to protect the prerogatives of the
states.2 79 The affirmative votes of two Houses of Congress plus the Presi-
dent are required, or a supermajority of both Houses without the Presi-
dent. The well-known political safeguards of federalism bias the legislative
process in favor of the states. The Constitution in this respect sacrifices
efficiency in the service of other values. 2s ° The obstacles the Constitution
places in the way of legislative action to protect the states, however, make
it difficult for the political branches to respond to state activity that of-
fends foreign nations with the dispatch that would be necessary to prevent
the feared adverse consequences. Because the stakes are so high in the
foreign affairs area, direct judicial intervention in these situations is war-
ranted.28 1 Because this is not an area in which the states have any legiti-
mate role to play, to permit the pro-state bias of the legislative process to
operate in this context would be inappropriate. 282
Peter Spiro recognizes-indeed, he affirmatively argues-that these
considerations once provided a powerful justification for the Zschernigdoc-
trine. However, he believes that the premises of the argument no longer
hold, and that the doctrine should accordingly be abandoned. He argues
278. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 370.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69, 88-91.
280. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 920 (1983).
281. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 8, at 1239; Ramsey, supra note 8, at 371 &
n.122.
282. In addition to the "notorious difficulties of overcoming legislative iner-
tia," Spiro notes that "the typical case will, almost by definition, pit foreign interests
against domestic ones" and the foreign interests "are deprived of one of the most
effective tools of influence, namely money and votes." Spiro, supra note 8, at 1253.
But cf. Delahunty, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that foreign interests are represented
by domestic proxies, such as importers). In my view, the problem is not so much
that foreign interests are not represented, but that one of the most important do-
mestic interests in these cases, the interest in harmonious international relations, is
of the diffuse sort that tends to lose out in the political process. See infra note 351
and accompanying text.
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that, because foreign states are now able to target their retaliation against
individual states, foreign affairs activity by the parts no longer threatens
the whole.2 83 He offers as examples of targeted retaliation the steps taken
by Mexico and Japan against California in retaliation for that state's laws
concerning the treatment of immigrants and the taxing of foreign corpo-
rations, and steps taken by Europe and Canada against Texas to retaliate
against its application of the death penalty.
28 4
I am not persuaded. First, while considerations such as these might
arguably justify congressional repudiation of dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine, courts seem particularly ill-suited to assess the significance of the
developments Spiro describes, or indeed to making the factual determina-
tions on which he bases his critique. 285 In any event, three instances of
targeted retaliation seem an insufficient basis on which to discard the
Zschernig doctrine, especially in the light of counter-examples offered by
others.286 Moreover, even if foreign states are able to limit their retalia-
tion to the offending state, they still have the discretion under interna-
tional law and practice to direct their retaliation more broadly, and they
surely will do so if they deem it more effective. Spiro argues that states can
be expected to target their retaliation to the offending state because
targeted retaliation will achieve their goals more effectively.28 7 The
counterexamples show either that this is not always the case or that foreign
states have not yet learned that lesson.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would appear to be in the
nation's interest to resist this trend. The Founders felt strongly that the
nation would be better off if foreign states dealt with the United States as a
unit.288 Spiro has not shown why it would be in the nation's interest now
for foreign states to deal with us separately. Indeed, his analysis suggests
that it would not be. Spiro asserts that compliance with international-law
norms would probably improve if his proposal were adopted because, be-
ing a powerful nation with a large market, the United States today can
often get away with violating such norms. Individual states would be more
responsive to attempts to discipline them. 289 This suggests that it may be
in the interest of the international community for the United States to
disband, but it fails to explain what's in it for the United States. Analo-
283. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1261.
284. See id. at 1261-64.
285. Spiro's argument thus places him at odds with the critics of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine who stress the incapacity ofjudges to make foreign policy
judgments. See infra Part 1V(C). I share Spiro's view that the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine does not in fact license foreign policy making byjudges. See Spiro,
supra note 8, at 1260. Spiro's basis for urging a judicial rejection of the doctrine,
however, relies on foreign policy judgments that appear to me to be inappropriate
for judges.
286. See, e.g., Denning & McCall, supra note 257, at 12-13.
287. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1267.
288. See Clark, supra note 274, at 1297.
289. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1267-68.
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gously, it may well be in the interest of consumers and competitors for
Microsoft to be broken up, but Microsoft certainly does not believe a
breakup is in its interest. Spiro forthrightly acknowledges that his propo-
sal has the tendency to produce the disintegration of the Union. 290 He
has not made the case that such disintegration would be good for the
United States.
Spiro also argues that dormant foreign affairs doctrine is unnecessary
today because, with the waning of the Cold War, the stakes of interna-
tional friction are significantly lower than they were when Zschernig was
decided. 29 1 Again, I have concerns about the propriety of judges (or aca-
demics) revising a constitutional default rule based on their perception of
a diminution of the potential dangers of international friction. The issue
should be left to the political branches. For what it is worth, this academic
does not share Spiro's belief that the stakes are significantly lower today.
Spiro's evaluation of the risks of international friction may have seemed
reasonable when he made it in the winter of 1999. In the fall of 2001, it
seems difficult to maintain that "the imperative of national defense" has
"dissipate [d] " to the point where "[o]ne might question whether ... vul-
nerability should concern US" 29 2 or that "survival is no longer so clearly at
stake in foreign relations decision making."293
Michael Ramsey advances a different sort of structural critique of dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine. He acknowledges that the Framers wanted
to place the ultimate responsibility for foreign affairs in the national gov-
ernment,29 4 but he denies that they went so far as to disable the states
from acting in the area in ways that do not conflict with the express
prohibitions in the Constitution or with foreign policy affirmatively set by
the political branches by legislation. He recognizes that it might have
been better for the Framers to have adopted some sort of dormant foreign
policy preemption, 295 but he argues that doctrines cannot be read into
290. He observes that, "[t]o the extent we no longer consider ourselves a na-
tion in respect to other nations, perhaps we no longer need a strong bond of
nationhood, or perhaps any bond at all." Spiro, supra note 8, at 1227.
291. See id. at 1223-24; see also Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1412.
292. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1275.
293. See id. at 1223-24. 1 do not mean to endorse here the claim of some
scholars that the events of September 11, 2001, will inevitably require a general
revision of federalism doctrine in a nationalist direction. Compare Linda Green-
house, Will the Court Reassert NationalAuthority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001 at WK14,
with Ernest Young, The Balance of Federalism in Unbalanced Times: Should the Supreme
Court Reconsider Its Federalism Precedents in Light of the War on Terrorism?, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011010-young.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2001); Marci Hamilton, Federalism and September 11: Why the Tragedy Should
Convince Congress to Concentrate on Truly National Topics, available at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20011025.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2001). 1
merely argue that these events call into question any effort to revise the federalism
doctrine based on a perception that the risks of international friction are signifi-
cantly lower today than during the Cold War.
294. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 370.
295. See id. at 371.
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the Constitution unless the absence of the doctrine would be "so funda-
mentally irrational that it could not have been the understanding of the
constitutional generation." 296 He goes on to offer a rationale for permit-
ting states to legislate in ways that intrude upon foreign policy as long as
they have not been prohibited from doing so by statute. In his view, a no-
dormant-foreign-affairs-preemption regime serves the rational purpose of
protecting Congress' role in foreign policy-making from usurpation by the
President.
Ramsey's structural defense of a no-dormant-preemption rule is based
on what appears to me to be a misunderstanding of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. Ramsey regards the doctrine as invalidating state laws
that conflict or otherwise interfere with substantive foreign policies of the
United States. When a substantive foreign policy has been made through
the normal legislative process, dormant foreign affairs preemption is un-
necessary because there will be actual, affirmative preemption.2 97 Thus,
Ramsey concludes that the significance of the dormant foreign policy doc-
trine (as he calls it) lies in its invalidation of state laws that interfere with
foreign policies made by the President alone. 298 He concludes that a no-
dormant-preemption rule serves the rational purpose of protecting Con-
gress' prerogatives in the foreign affairs area from usurpation by the Presi-
dent.2 99 He emphasizes that he does not claim that a no-dormant-
preemption rule would be better, only that it would be rational..3 0 0 Be-
cause a rational basis for the rule exists, the constitutional structure does
not "compel' the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine.
30
'
I disagree. First, as Ramsey appears to recognize, his structural argu-
ment depends ultimately on his textual and historical arguments. If the
Constitution grants the President the power to make preemptive foreign
policy without Congress, then his structural argument collapses. Thus,
Ramsey goes on to offer textual and historical arguments for concluding
that, while the Constitution does grant the President some independent
powers in the foreign affairs area, it does not grant him an independent
power to preempt state law.302 Be that as it may, Ramsey's defense of a no-
dormant-preemption rule ultimately fails because it is based on a subtle
but critical misconception about the Zschernig doctrine. The doctrine does
not invalidate state laws that interfere with substantive foreign policies of
the United States. It invalidates state laws that threaten one particular for-
eign relations interest of the United States: its interest in harmonious in-
ternational relations. The Zschernig doctrine presumes that the nation has
such an interest, and it reflects the ideas that (a) this national interest
296. See id.
297. See id. at 376.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 378-79.
300. See id. at 378.
301. See id. (emphasis in original).
302. See id. at 403-29.
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should prevail unless it is .outweighed by countervailing national interests,
and (b) the decision about whether countervailing national interests out-
weigh the interest in harmonious international relations must be made by
the national political branches. In the absence of a decision by those
branches to take or authorize threats to our international relations, the
courts are entrusted to protect the national interest in harmonious inter-
national relations by invalidating state laws that pose a significant threat to
such relations. 30
3
So understood, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine (as I call it) takes
no position on the scope of the President's independent powers in the
foreign relations area. The limits on the President's powers, whatever they
might be, can be enforced by the courts quite independently of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine.3 0 4 There is no need to give a role to the
states in enforcing those limits. Indeed, if the courts are ill-suited for for-
e ign policy judgments,1° 5 the states are even more so. Without a rational
explanation for permitting the states to engage in activity that significantly
threatens the nation's international relations, Ramsey is left without a basis
for rejecting dormant foreign affairs preemption, a doctrine that flows
303. To support his understanding of the Zschernig doctrine, Ramsey quotes
the Court's statement that "[state] regulations must give way if they impair the
effective exercise of the nation's foreign policy." Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440, quoted
in Ramsey, supra note 8, at 376. But the Court did not say here that state laws are
invalid whenever they conflict with particular substantive foreign policies of the
national government. In context, the Court clearly meant that such state laws im-
pair the nation's ability to conduct its foreign policy effectively simply by produc-
ing international friction. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440 (stating that Oregon's law
"affects foreign relations in a persistent and subtle way"); id. at 441 (expressing
concern about state laws that "disturb foreign relations"); id. (stating that Oregon
law "has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the
power of the federal government to deal with [foreign relations] problems"). In-
deed, the Oregon law was probably in sync with the general policy of the federal
government at the time towards communist regimes, which was by no means
friendly.
At one point, Ramsey suggests that partial toleration of the regime in Burma
counts as a Presidential policy, see Ramsey, supra note 8, at 399 n. 214, albeit one
that, in his view, states need not defer to (as it is merely a Presidential policy). If
Presidential inaction counts as a presidential policy of toleration, then presumably
congressional inaction would count as a congressional policy of toleration. If he
would require the conflicting policies of the states to yield to such a policy, then he
has in effect embraced the view of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine I defend in
the text. What he would call a congressional policy of toleration, I would call a
constitutional policy valuing international harmony in the absence of the articula-
tion of a contrary policy by the federal political branches. My formulation has the
advantage of describing the facts more accurately (it is not necessarily true that
congressional inaction reflects a congressional policy of toleration), and avoids the
related Chadha problems.
304. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding Algiers
Accords on narrow grounds); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (invalidating President Truman's seizure of steel mills during Korean War).
Thus, it is not true that "removing the states from foreign affairs broadens Presi-
dential power." Ramsey, supra note 8, at 378-79.
305. See infra Part IV(C) (considering this argument).
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from the "undeniable" premise that "[f] oreign policy is perhaps the defin-
itive national issue."3 °6
Finally, critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine argue that the
doctrine has the unfortunate result of squelching state activity that can
help improve human rights conditions in foreign countries.30 7 In their
solicitude for human rights abroad, critics of Zschernig on the right are
joined by human rights activists and critics of global trade on the left, who
have criticized the dormant foreign affairs doctrine on similar grounds.30 8
If disabling states from imposing economic sanctions against oppressive
foreign regimes would indeed retard the progress of human rights in such
countries, I would agree that this would be unfortunate.3 0 9 I note, how-
ever, that the interpretation of Zschernig I suggest here would not necessa-
rily preclude states from taking purely expressive action to denounce
foreign human rights violations. 310 Nor would it necessarily even con-
demn the sanctions struck down by the Court in Crosby itself, which con-
ceivably might have been upheld under a market-participant exception,
which may well be constitutionally required under current precedents. 3 t '
On the other hand, the Massachusetts sanctions may have been illegal
quite apart from either the Federal Burma Law or the dormant foreign
affairs power, albeit under a statute that the plaintiff lacked standing to
invoke.3 12 If so, the claim that the dormant foreign affairs power hinders
the progress of human rights in this context rings hollow; it does only if
the states are willing to violate solemn treaty commitments and the federal
government lacks the will to require compliance.
In any event, the concern over human rights in Burma that I share
with the critics of dormant foreign affairs preemption is beside the point.
306. Ramsey, supra note 8, at 371.
307. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1638 (critiquing doctrine as
interfering with legitimate state objectives); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Human Rights on the Eve of the Next Century: U.N. Human Rights Standards & U.S.
Law: The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 319, 368-69 (1997).
308. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1259; Stumberg, supra note 213, at 117.
309. Compare the South Africa sanctions with the sanctions that have been in
place against Cuba for forty-odd years. See GARY C. HUFBAUER, ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 92-93 (2d ed. 1990) (compar-
ing effectiveness of sanctions).
310. See generally Matthew Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives
and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L.
1 (1999) (examining strength of federal power over foreign affairs in speech con-
text). Even purely expressive activity condemning human rights violations abroad
can have detrimental effects on our foreign relations, however. See Paul Glastris,
Armenia's History, Turkey's Dilemma, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at BO (describing
Turkey's anger over proposed resolution condemning genocide committed
against Armenians). Moreover, Zschernig itself seemed primarily concerned about
the problems caused by the purely expressive aspects of the Oregon law at issue in
that case.
311. For further discussion, see supra Part III(A).
312. For further discussion, see supra Part III(B) (3).
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Whether human rights would be advanced in places like Burma by laws
such as that enacted by Massachusetts and, if so, at what cost to the na-
tion's other foreign and domestic policy goals are quintessentially political
questions which the critics of dormant foreign affairs preemption quite
rightly argue should be made by Congress and not the courts. The Su-
preme Court in Crosby may have been correct in concluding that Congress
implicitly made that judgment. It did not make that judgment when it
decided to impose federal sanctions on Burma, but it may have implicitly
made the judgment by failing to repudiate the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine, and by legislating in this area in apparent reliance on the contin-
ued existence of that doctrine. In any event, the Court has articulated a
sound constitutional default rule under which harmonious international
relations prevail unless the federal political branches affirmatively deter-
mine otherwise.
C. Functional Critiques
Critics of Zschernig have also raised a variety of what I shall call func-
tional critiques of the doctrine. They have argued that, in the light of
globalization, a doctrine that depends on drawing a sharp line between
domestic and foreign affairs is untenable. They have argued as well that
judges lack the institutional capacity to make the sorts of foreign policy
judgments that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine requires of them.
They argue further that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine runs counter
to the Court's turn to formalism in foreign relations law and to the politi-
cal branches' increasing toleration of, and indeed deference to, foreign
affairs activity by the states. I conclude that these critiques require, at
most, a reformulation of dormant foreign affairs doctrine. I propose that
the Court reformulate the Zschernig doctrine in a way that makes
Zschernigs vague "forbidden line" brighter. The Court should begin by
holding that state sanctions that single out foreign states (or their citizens
or those who do business with them) for unfavorable treatment are cate-
gorically forbidden unless affirmatively authorized by Congress. 3 13
7schernig's critics argue that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
untenable because globalization makes it impossible to draw a line be-
tween domestic and foreign affairs. 3 14 In the light of globalization, they
313. I express no opinion here about whether a procurement policy such as Massachu-
selts'should count as "sanctions "for purposes of this rule. I suggested in Part III(A) that it
may be unconstitutionalfor Congress to impose greater burdens on the states than on private
individuals performing like activities. If the Zschernig rule I propose above were based
directly on the Constitution, this constitutional limit would appear to be inapplica-
ble. However, to the extent the rule is based on implicit congressional acquies-
cence in the Zschernig decision, the constitutional problem discussed in Part III(A)
might arise.
314. See Young, supra note 99, at 177; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8,
at 1670-80. Cf Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REv. 649, 651 (2000) (noting distinction between foreign and domestic is increas-
ingly unclear).
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argue, a doctrine that bars the states from interfering in foreign affairs
would sweep too broadly and invalidate too much traditional state regula-
tion.31 5 These arguments would support the rejection of a doctrine under
which states were forbidden to legislate in a manner that affected foreign
affairs, for it is true that practically anything that states (or, for that matter,
large corporations) do has an effect on foreign affairs. But, although
some courts have articulated the dormant foreign affairs doctrine in such
broad terms, 3 16 this broad interpretation of Zschernig has never enjoyed
widespread support. State law has traditionally governed matters that have
a significant effect on foreign affairs, such as choice of law and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, and the courts have continued to regard such
matters as governed by state law despite Zschernig.3 17 Although scholars
have argued forcefully that some such matters should be governed by fed-
eral common law, 318 the courts have yet to follow this advice. Zschernig has
in fact been applied cautiously by most courts.3 19
Another argument against the dormant foreign affairs doctrine relies
on the notion that courts are ill-suited to make determinations or judg-
ments about foreign policy.3 20 Such judgments, it is argued, should be
315. See Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra note 11, at 1413 (recognizing effects
of doctrine may sweep into other areas).
316. See Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (D.N.M. 1980);
N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968
(N.Y. 1977) (plurality opinion).
317. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. Couwrs 14, 938-
39 (3d ed. 1996).
318. See e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law:
Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IowA L. REv. 165,
211-14 (1988).
319. See, e.g., Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
2001), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low, 70 U.S.L.W. 3026 (U.S.
June 26, 2001) (No. 00-1926). The bete noire of Zschernig's detractors did not even
rely on Zschernig. Zschernig's critics love to hate Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
113 F.3d 540 (1997). See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1695-98; Ram-
sey, supra note 8, at 362; see also Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D.
Tex. 1994). The courts in those cases upheld the removal to federal court of tort
actions brought by aliens against companies operating abroad on the ground that
the cases raised "issues of international relations [that] are incorporated into fed-
eral common law." Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 63; see also Torres, 113 F.3d at 543
(relying on Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986)). The
holdings of these cases are problematic because, even if it were true that the cases
raised issues of federal common law, it is highly doubtful the plaintiffs' suits "arose
under" those principles within the meaning of the general federal question stat-
utes. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154 (1908) (artic-
ulating well-pleaded complaint rule). Cf Carlos M. Vdzquez, Comment, Verlinden
B.V. v. Federal Bank of Nigeria: Federal Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and
Foreign States, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1070-74 (1982) (arguing that cases raising
Zschernig and Sabbatino issues "arise under" federal law within the meaning of Art.
IllI of Constitution, but not necessarily within meaning of federal question stat-
utes). Badly reasoned decisions that did not even rely on Zschernig are hardly a
compelling basis for rejecting that decision.
320. See Bilder, supra note 3, at 830; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at
1668 (stating that judges may be incapable of deciding foreign relation); John C.
13172001]
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made by the political branches, meaning Congress and/or the President.
Again, the premise has some force, but it does not follow that the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine must be rejected. The dormant foreign affairs
doctrine does not license the courts to make foreign policy; rather, it re-
quires them to ensure that only the national political branches conduct
foreign policy.32 '
Of course, if the dormant foreign affairs doctrine does not invalidate
all state activity that has an effect on foreign affairs, but only those state
activities that have an unduly adverse effect on foreign policy, then it ar-
guably does require the courts to make a sort of foreign policy judgment:
they must determine the extent to which a particular state activity has an
effect on foreign relations and whether that interference is excessive
(under whatever standard). It may be true that the courts are ill-equipped
to make such determinations. But the courts' incapacity for making for-
eign policy judgments is not of a constitutional dimension. I do not un-
derstand the critics to be arguing that a federal statute invalidating state laws
that unduly interfere with the federal government's conduct of foreign
affairs could not constitutionally be enforced in the courts. The problem,
if there is one, is that the courts have been invalidating such statutes with-
out prior authorization by Congress. But, as already noted, the stare deci-
sis doctrine tells us that Congress' failure to repudiate the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine may be tantamount to authorization. If courts are
indeed ill-suited to such judgments, this may warrant the conclusion that
Zschernigwas wrongly decided, but it does not follow that it should be over-
ruled. The existence of Zschernig has made it unnecessary for Congress to
enact a general "foreign affairs preemption" statute.
The problem is not so much that the courts are worse than the legisla-
ture at making such judgments, 3 22 but that, given the open-ended nature
of the inquiry, vesting the judiciary with such authority undermines the
rule of law values of certainty, predictability and consistent treatment of
like cases. Both problems would be mitigated by a move towards a formal-
ist approach to the dormant foreign affairs power. Such a move would be
Yoo, Federal Courts As Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 764-69 (1997).
321. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1256.
322. I stress that my argument here concerns competence as opposed to legit-
imacy. I am assuming for purposes of this analysis that there is a national interest
in harmonious international relations based either on the Constitution or on stare
decisis that would legitimate judicial involvement but for concerns about the com-
petence of judges to make judgments about foreign relations. Thus, while the
legislature clearly possesses greater legitimacy in making these judgments (a supe-
riority that is manifested in the recognition that Congress may permit state activity
that would otherwise be preempted by the Zschernig doctrine), it is not clear that
the courts are institutionally less competent than Congress at detecting and re-
sponding to state activity that poses a threat to harmonious international relations.
See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1255 (noting that "forces that distort political-branch
decision making in these controversies" and opining that judges "seem ... institu-
tionally competent to decide such cases").
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in keeping with the trend in the Court's jurisprudence both inside and
outside the foreign relations area.3 23 Formalism entails a greater reliance
on formal categories and a disdain for balancing tests. The categorical
approach leads to the adoption of potentially over- or under- inclusive
rules, but such over- or under-inclusiveness is thought to be necessary be-
cause of the courts' incapacity for engaging in case-by-case judgments and
the instability or unpredictability of a case-by-case approach. A doctrine
invalidating state laws that unduly interfere with foreign affairs, and thus
requiring a case-by-case assessment of the foreign relations impact of a
particular state law, would be in tension with the recent turn to formalism.
But a rule invalidating a particular category of state law that the Court con-
cludes is especially likely to cause foreign relations problems, such as state
laws that impose sanctions on particular foreign countries, would be fully
consistent with it and would diminish the opportunities for the lower
courts to engage in foreign policy judgments. Of course, in non-sanctions
cases, the lower courts would still have to consider in the first instance
whether a particular category of state law is likely to cause severe foreign
relations problems in the long term. But, if the Court were to embrace
the categorical approach suggested here, the relevant inquiry would be
about a general category of state laws, and would not turn on the particu-
lar circumstances that gave rise to the case at hand (although of course
those facts might be instructive). A lower court's conclusion that a given
category of state law is preempted would be more likely to reach the Su-
preme Court, and would also be more likely to capture the attention of
Congress, which can revise the decision if it wishes.
Critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine cite the Supreme
Court's recent decisions reflecting greater formalism in the foreign affairs
area as evidence that the Court shares the critics' view that courts are ill-
suited to foreign affairs judgments of the sort the doctrine makes rele-
vant.324 While this may be true, a wholesale rejection of the doctrine does
not follow. Indeed, these cases show that formalism does not entail judi-
cial obliviousness to potential foreign relations problems. For example, in
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 325 the Court reaffirmed the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the justification for which is the desire to avoid
conflicts with foreign nations.326 Aramco has been criticized as sweeping
too broadly,3 2 7 but that is characteristic of formalist approaches. By re-
jecting the case-by-case approaches that predominate in modern choice of
323. See Goldsmith, New Formalism, supra note 11, at 1424 (noting shift from
Cold War approach to current, more formalistic approach).
324. See id. at 1424.
325. 499 U.S. 244 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco].
326. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248 ("It serves to protect against unin-
tended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.").
327. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REv. 179, 202-03.
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law, the Court revealed its aversion to case-by-case judgments in this area.
But, in this case, formalism resulted in a rule that overprotects the interest in
harmonious foreign relations.32 8 The Court might similarly approve of a
doctrine invalidating all state sanctions against foreign countries, even if
this overprotects the undoubted federal interest in harmonious foreign
relations.3 2 9
A move to a formalist version of dormant foreign affairs preemption
finds a precedent in the shift in the Court's approach to the act of state
doctrine between Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino30 and W.S. Kirkpat-
rick Co. v. Environmental Tectonics, Cop.3 3 1 The act of state doctrine is, in-
deed, a close cousin of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 332 It is a
federal common law rule that requires the courts to give effect to the acts
of foreign governments even if they might otherwise be questioned as ille-
gal or contrary to public policy.33 3- As explained in Sabbatino, the doctrine
has its basis in the separation of powers; it serves to protect the political
branches' conduct of foreign relations from interference by the courts.
33 4
But, as formulated in Sabbatino, the doctrine required courts to determine
whether refusing to give effect to certain acts of foreign states would be
perceived as an insult by those states and thus interfere unduly with our
foreign relations. 3 5 Like the Zschernig doctrine, the act of state doctrine
has been controversial, and scholars have vociferously called for its aban-
donment. 33 6 Critics argued that courts were ill-suited to make the kinds of
judgments the doctrine called for, judgments about the extent to which
certain acts would offend foreign states.33 7 As with the Zschernig doctrine,
328. To be sure, other decisions opt for categorical rules that underprotect
this interest. See, e.g., Hartford Fire his. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
Whether either or both of these decisions were decided correctly is beside the
point. I mention them merely to show that formalism does not necessarily require
rejection of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
329. If the Court were to replace the current standard with a series of bright-
line rules, the formal approach could well underprotect the interest in harmoni-
ous foreign relations by leaving gaps. The Court might opt instead to supplement
the categorical rules with an open-ended catch-all standard. While doing so threat-
ens to vitiate the benefits of the move to a more formal approach, the Court could
minimize this problem by reserving the catch-all standard for egregious cases.
330. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
331. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
332. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 1630 (noting that Sabbatino
and Zschernig "involved the exercise of functionally identical judicial lawmaking
powers").
333. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 422.
334. Id. at 423.
335. See F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Eng'rs Consulting Firm v. Harza Eng'g
Co., 882 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1989) ("For an American court to say to Iran, 'We
won't pay any attention to your seizure of the Consulting Firm without compensa-
tion to the owners, because it's the sort of act that is abhorrent to Americans,'
would be a slap in the face of the Iranian regime.").
336. See, e.g., Michael Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L.
Rtv. 325 (1986).
337. See id. at 376-84.
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some lower courts applied the doctrine broadly.3 38 For example, some
courts held that the doctrine barred courts from adjudicating a case if
doing so would entail a questioning of a foreign state's motivations. 339 In
Kirkpatrick, the Court addressed these concerns by modifying the doctrine
rather than abandoning it. The Court self-consciously adopted a formalist
approach. It rejected the idea that the "policies underlying the doctrine"
were "a doctrine unto themselves," requiring a case-by-case examination of
the likelihood that a foreign state would be offended. 340 Instead, it read
Sabbatino as having relied on the relevant policies in order to articulate a
general rule that could be applied across a range of cases with little need
for individualized foreign policy judgments. 341
The Court in Crosby could have similarly struck down the Massachu-
setts Burma Law on the basis of an interpretation of Zschernig as barring
state laws that single out one or a group of foreign states (or their citizens
or those who deal with them) for unfavorable treatment. Such an inter-
pretation would have comported comfortably with the reasoning of the
Court in Zschernig, and it seems to capture the Justices' central concern in
that case.3 42 Interpreting Zschernig to condemn all laws that single out
particular foreign states or groups of foreign states for unfavorable treat-
ment would also distinguishes virtually all of the Supreme Court cases
cited by Zscherni's critics as counter-examples, as such cases involved state
laws that treated all aliens equally badly.343 This interpretation would
have avoided the need for a case-by-case assessment of the way particular
state laws have been implemented or whether such laws are likely to cause
offense, or whether that matters in a particular instance. Such a basis for
invalidating the Massachusetts law, moreover, would have been narrower
338. See Susan Morrison, The Act of State Doctrine and the Demise of International
Comity, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 311, 326 (1991) (discussing lower court appli-
cation of doctrine).
339. See O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830
F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding adjudication barred if state's motives are
questioned); Clayco Petroleum v. Occidental Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th
Cir. 1983) (same).
340. W.S. Kirkpatrick Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
341. See id. at 406-09.
342. Both of the lower courts in Crosby relied heavily on the "singling-out"
feature of the Massachusetts Burma Law. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
Their emphasis of this feature is consistent with the Court's statement in Zschernig
that laws that have only "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries"
remained valid. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 (1968). It is true that
the Oregon law at issue in Zschernig did not single out any particular foreign state
or group of foreign states, but the Court in Zschernig invalidated the law because it
had been applied by the courts in a way that singled out communist states for
disfavorable treatment. See id. at 440.
343. Cf Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. 259, 269 (1817) (involving 1780 Act of Mary-
land entitled "An act to declare and ascertain the privileges of the subjects of
France residing within this state," but singling French citizens out for more
favorable treatment).
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than the rationale given by the Court as it would have had no implications
for preemption doctrine in other contexts.
Critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine also claim that the po-
litical branches have already revealed their disapproval of the doctrine's
premise that state activity impinging on foreign relations should be inva-
lid. They argue that Congress' approach in the last decades to resolving
conflicts between foreign affairs and the interests of states demonstrates its
desire that the latter take precedence. 3 4 4 As noted above, when Congress
implemented the AGP, as well as the other World Trade Organization
agreements, it specifically provided that state laws could not be challenged
on the basis of these agreements except by the United States. 345 Indeed,
the federal government made the substantive obligations of these agree-
ments applicable only to the states that agreed to be bound by them. 346
Similarly, in ratifying human rights treaties in the past few decades, Con-
gress has routinely included in such treaties a "federalism" understanding.
The understanding attached to the International Covenant on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is illustrative:
The United States understands that this Convention shall be im-
plemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exer-
cises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise
by the state and local governments. To the extent that state and
local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate mea-
sures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.3 47
The exact meaning and effect of this understanding is a matter of some
uncertainty, 48 but the understanding does appear to reflect deference to
state interests. The federalism understandings have been accompanied by
declarations to the effect that the treaties are not to be regarded as self-
executing. Although the meaning and effect of these declarations is also
disputed,3 49 they seem to reflect a preference for non-judicial enforce-
ment of these treaties. Together, these provisions may be read to reflect
the political branches' wish to preserve state autonomy even in the area of
344. See Delahunty, supra note 8, at 47; Stumberg, supra note 11, at 524.
345. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (1994). See generally Charles Tiefer, Free Trade
Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 63-72 (1998).
346. See Tiefer, supra note 345, at 62.
347. S. EXEc. REP. No. 103-29, at 25 (1994).
348. Compare V;izquez, supra note 149, at 1355-58 (understanding appears to
mean that national government will not exercise legislative power it possesses),
with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 455-56 (2000) (understanding notifies parties of
constitutional limits of federal legislative power).
349. Compare David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 220
(1999) (arguing that declarations only purport to deny private rights of action),
with Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 348, at 401 (arguing that declarations make
covenant judicially unenforceable).
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foreign affairs, particularly when it comes to attempts by private parties
and foreign governments to challenge state action in court. Zschernig's
critics argue that these provisions rebut any inference that Congress acqui-
esces in the judicial invalidation of state laws that, in the view of the courts,
unduly interfere with the national government's conduct of foreign
affairs.
To the contrary, these provisions illustrate that the states have been
remarkably successful at protecting their interests through the political
process, even in the area of foreign affairs. Indeed, the states can arguably
be expected to be more successful in the foreign affairs realm than in the
purely domestic realm, as the interests that compete most directly with the
states' are usually defended by entities that are not represented in Con-
gress.350 Of course, the nation as a whole has an interest in harmonious
international relations, but this is the sort of diffuse interest that tends to
lose out in the political process. 35 1 In any event, the critics' claims that
these provisions show a congressional intent to permit state foreign affairs
activity in other areas suffers from the same analytical flaw that the critics
ascribe to the defenders of Zschernig. Congress' approval of state foreign
affairs activity in these statutes shows that Congress authorized state for-
eign affairs activity to the extent permitted by these provisions but not
further. The fact that Congress had the power to go further and did not
is, indeed, one of the reasons for retaining the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. The states' success in protecting their interests in this context is,
if anything, a reason not to be too concerned about the judicial articula-
tion of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine along the lines sketched above.
It suggests that the states are perfectly capable of making their preferences
felt and achieving the reversal in the political process of any judicial deci-
sion holding a class of state laws preempted as likely to interfere unduly
with foreign relations.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued here that, contrary to the claims of some critics of
Zschernig, Crosby does not portend the withering of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Crosby is
a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise. The approach to obstacle pre-
emption employed by the Court in Crosby is subject to the same objections
that critics of federal common law have directed at that doctrine. If the
Massachusetts Burma Law posed an obstacle to the achievement of the full
purposes of the Federal Burma Law, then it similarly posed an obstacle to
achievement of the goals of the Constitution itself. At a minimum, and
350. See Spiro, supra note 8, at 1253-54.
351. This, of course, is standard public choice theory. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 342 (1998) ("People
with relatively narrow but intense interests can capture the political process from
those with wide but diffuse interests." (citation omitted)).
132320011
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1323 2001
1324 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 46: p. 1259
contrary to the Court's protestations, the outcome in Crosby seems explica-
ble only through the application of a presumption that state statutes in the
foreign affairs area are preempted by federal statutes on the same subject.
If so, then Zschernig has at most been transformed into a clear statement
rule, requiring Congress to say so explicitly if it wants state laws in the
foreign affairs area to remain in force. Crosby would have rested on
sounder, and narrower, grounds had the Court interpreted Zschernig to
bar state laws that single out a state or group of states for unfavorable
treatment. Such laws are the opposite of laws that have but an indirect or
incidental effect on foreign nations. They directly contravene Zschernigs
affirmation that states may not conduct their own foreign policies. 352
352. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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